Private Index Coding by Narayanan, Varun et al.
1Private Index Coding
Varun Narayanan∗, Jithin Ravi†, Vivek K. Mishra‡, Bikash Kumar Dey§, Nikhil Karamchandani§,
Vinod M. Prabhakaran∗
∗Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, Mumbai, †Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Legane´s, Spain,
‡Qualcomm, India, §Indian Institute of Technology Bombay, Mumbai
Emails: varun.narayanan@tifr.res.in, rjithin@tsc.uc3m.es, vivemish@qti.qualcomm.com, {bikash,
nikhilk}@ee.iitb.ac.in, vinodmp@tifr.res.in
Abstract
We study the fundamental problem of index coding under an additional privacy constraint that requires each
receiver to learn nothing more about the collection of messages beyond its demanded messages from the server and
what is available to it as side information. To enable such private communication, we allow the use of a collection
of independent secret keys, each of which is shared amongst a subset of users and is known to the server. The goal
is to study properties of the key access structures which make the problem feasible and then design encoding and
decoding schemes efficient in the size of the server transmission as well as the sizes of the secret keys. We call this
the private index coding problem.
We begin by characterizing the key access structures that make private index coding feasible. We also give
conditions to check if a given linear scheme is a valid private index code. For up to three users, we characterize the
rate region of feasible server transmission and key rates, and show that all feasible rates can be achieved using scalar
linear coding and time sharing; we also show that scalar linear codes are sub-optimal for four receivers. The outer
bounds used in the case of three users are extended to arbitrary number of users and seen as a generalized version
of the well-known polymatroidal bounds for the standard non-private index coding. We also show that the presence
of common randomness and private randomness does not change the rate region. Furthermore, we study the case
where no keys are shared among the users and provide some necessary and sufficient conditions for feasibility in
this setting under a weaker notion of privacy. If the server has the ability to multicast to any subset of users, we
demonstrate how this flexibility can be used to provide privacy and characterize the minimum number of server
multicasts required.
I. INTRODUCTION
Index coding [1]–[5] is a fundamental problem in network information theory which studies a setup consisting of
a server with N messages x1, x2, . . . , xN communicating with N users over a noiseless broadcast channel. Each
user i is assumed to have prior knowledge of a subset of the N messages, referred to as its side information, and
wants to obtain xi. The goal of the index coding problem is to minimize the server transmission size while satisfying
all the user demands. In this work, we introduce an additional privacy constraint wherein each user i should learn
no additional information about the messages other than those present in its side information set and its requested
message xi. To enable such private communication, we allow the use of a collection of independent secret keys,
each of which is shared amongst a subset of users and is known to the server. The goal is to study properties of the
key access structures which make the problem feasible and then design encoding and decoding schemes which
utilize them efficiently in terms of the sizes of the server transmission and the secret keys. We call this the private
index coding problem.
The index coding problem was introduced by Birk and Kol [1], where it was observed that significant gain in
the rate of transmission can be obtained by utilizing the broadcast nature of the network. Since then, the problem
has garnered significant attention and various aspects have been addressed (see [5] for a survey). Characterizing
the optimal transmission rate for an index coding problem is known to be hard [2] in general and there have been
several works aimed at obtaining good upper and lower bounds, see, e.g., [6]–[10]. Restricting attention to linear
encoding schemes, Bar-Yossef et al. [2] obtained the optimal rate for a general index coding problem. Lubetzky and
Stav [11] showed that there exist index coding problems where non-linear codes strictly outperform linear codes.
While the broadcast nature of the network helps in reducing the transmission rate in index coding, it does adversely
affect user privacy. Some recent works have studied the security and privacy aspects of index coding. Roughly,
these works can be divided into two groups. The first group, including [12]–[19], considers the security against an
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2eavesdropper who tries to learn some information about the messages by wiretapping the broadcast link from the
server to the users. The second group, including [20]–[25], considers privacy aspects amongst the legitimate users.
Security against an eavesdropper who has access to a subset of messages was first studied by Dau et al. [12].
They obtained the conditions that any linear code should satisfy to achieve decodability as well as secrecy. Ong
et al. studied similar problems [14], [16], where an equivalence between secure index coding and secure network
coding was shown. For this problem, Liu et al. [18] gave an achievable scheme using a secret key with vanishingly
small rate. Ong et al. [15] further considered a weaker notion of security where the eavesdropper cannot gather any
information about each individual message outside its side information set. Note that this does not preclude the
eavesdropper from gaining some information about the entire collection of such messages.
Mojahedian et al. [17] studied the security against an eavesdropper without any side information and provided
schemes which achieve secrecy using a key shared between the server and the users. Securely transmitting a
single message to a group of users against more than one adversary was considered in a recent work [19]. Here,
the legitimate users and the adversaries possess some subsets of the keys that the server has, and the required
transmission rate and the necessary key rates have been analysed for some special cases.
Karmoose et al. [20] studied the issue of privacy amongst the legitimate users, where each user wants to hide the
identities of its side information messages and its demanded messages from the other users. Making the observation
that for a linear code, a user may learn about the identities of other users side information and requested messages
from the encoding matrix, they proposed a scheme to preserve privacy by not fully revealing the encoding matrix [20].
In contrast to this, our work considers a different privacy constraint where no user should get any information
concerning the set of messages that have neither been requested by it nor are in its side information set. It will turn
out that, under all but trivial cases, the above privacy requirement can be met only if some subsets of users possess
exclusive keys.
We also study a weaker notion of privacy where each user does not learn any information about each individual
message not present in its side information or requested by it, but may gain some information about the entire
collection of all such messages. This is similar to the notion of 1-block security [12] or weak security [15] defined
in the context of eavesdropper security. Liu et al. [24] extended this setup to a setting where the weak privacy
constraint is required only against a subset of the messages not available to a user. Recently, some works [22], [23],
[25] studied the notion of weak privacy for a variant of the index coding problem called the Pliable Index CODing
(PICOD(t)) introduced by Brahma et al. [26], where each user wants to obtain any t ≥ 1 messages that it does not
have access to. Sasi et al. [25] studied PICOD(1) with the privacy condition that each user is able to decode exactly
one message outside its side information set for the special case of consecutive side information. A generalization
of [25] in terms of the form of the side information sets was investigated by Liu et al. [22]. The authors further
extended their study to a decentralized setting [23] where communication occurs among users rather than by a
central server.
A. Contributions
Below, we briefly describe the main contributions of this work1.
1) Privacy with keys: We define the private index coding problem, where user privacy is enabled by sharing secret
keys of different sizes amongst the server and various subsets of users. Our interest here is to study the impact
of the key access structures on the feasibility of the private index coding problem and the tradeoff between the
server transmission rate and the sizes of the secret keys.
a) We characterize the key access structures that make private index coding feasible (Theorem 1). We give
conditions under which a given linear coding scheme is a valid private index code (Theorem 2).
b) We define the rate region of the private index coding problem as the set of all feasible tuples of the server
transmission rates and key rates. We characterize the rate region when the number of users is at most three
and show that all feasible rates can be achieved using scalar linear coding and time sharing (Theorem 4).
Further, we give an example of a private index coding problem with four users where all the feasible points
cannot be achieved using scalar linear coding (Theorem 5). This is in contrast to the non-private index
coding problem, where it was shown that scalar linear coding is optimal up to 4 users [27]. The outer bounds
1A preliminary version appeared in [21].
3used for characterizing the rate region for three users is generalized to any private index coding problem
(Theorem 6). These are a generalized version of the polymatroidal bounds for the index coding rate proposed
in [6].
c) We study the minimum sum key rate over all feasible key access structures and provide upper and lower
bounds (Theorem 7). From the characterization of the rate regions up to three users, we observe that the
minimum sum key rate and the optimal server transmission rate are achieved simultaneously in all those
cases, i.e., there is no trade-off between the optimal server transmission rate and the minimum sum key rate.
However, the question of whether this is indeed the case in general is yet unresolved and left open. We
do show that there exists a trade-off between the transmission rate and the size of the key access structure
(Example 2).
d) Finally, we consider the most general notion of private index coding that uses private randomness at the
server and the receivers, and also employs common randomness that is available to all agents. We show that
the rate region of such schemes coincides with the more limited family of private index codes which use
neither private randomness nor common randomness, thus justifying our limiting attention to such schemes
in the rest of the paper. Our result does not apply for perfect private index coding, in which we require ‘the
privacy and correctness error’ to be zero at all receivers (in our main definition, we only require these to
vanish asymptotically). Indeed, we leave the role of private randomness in perfect private index codes as an
open problem.
2) Weak privacy without keys: If no keys are shared among the users, then even weak privacy cannot be achieved
for all index coding problems. We derive a necessary condition that an index coding problem has to satisfy
for weak privacy to be feasible (Theorem 9). Further, we also give a sufficient condition (Theorem 10). We
characterize the condition under which a linear coding scheme achieves weak privacy (Theorem 11).
3) Privacy through multicasts: We consider a model in which there is no shared key between the server and the
users. However, the server can multicast to any subset of users and this flexibility is used to ensure privacy in
the index coding setting. For this model, we characterize the minimum number of multicasts required as the
fractional chromatic number of a certain graph specified by the index coding problem (Theorem 12).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We describe our private index coding setup in Section II and give
the characterization of a feasible key access structure in Section III. Our results on linear codes is presented in
Section IV. Characterization of rate regions up to three users and the polymatroidal outer bounds are provided in
Section V. We give our results on sum key rate in Section VI. The roles of private and common randomness in
private index coding are discussed in Section VII. Our results on weak privacy and private index coding through
multicast sessions are provided in Section VIII and Section IX, respectively.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND PRELIMINARIES
A server possesses N messages, X1, . . . , XN , and user i ∈ [N ] := {1, . . . , N} wants the message Xi. We assume
that Xi’s are independent and take values uniformly in a field F. For a subset of indices S ⊆ [N ], the set of
messages {Xi : i ∈ S} is represented by XS . Each user i has a subset of messages XAi as side information, where
Ai ⊆ [N ] \ {i}. Let Ai denote the set Ai ∪ {i}. Index coding problem can be represented by a directed graph G
with vertex set V (G) = [N ] and edge set E(G) such that (i, j) ∈ E if and only if j ∈ Ai. Complement of graph
G, denoted by Gc, has vertex set V (Gc) = [N ] and edge set E(Gc) = (E(G))c.
The privacy requirement we consider is that user i should not obtain any information about X
[N ]\Ai in an
asymptotic sense as given later. The server has access to keys that are shared among various subsets of users. A key is
a random variable that is independent of the messages and other keys. For S ( [N ],S 6= ∅, let b ∈ {0, 1}N \ {~0,~1}
represent the characteristic vector of S , i.e., ith bit in b, denoted by b(i), is 1 if and only if i ∈ S. The key that is
available exclusively to users in S is denoted by Kb.
We allow block coding, i.e., the server observes n independent copies of each message before transmission. For
block length n, we assume that the key Kb takes values in the set {1, · · · , |F|nRb} uniformly at random, where Rb
denotes the rate of the key2.
Let B denote the set of all keys, i.e., B = {0, 1}N \ {~0,~1}. For i ∈ [N ], let b(i) denote the ith bit in b. The
subset of keys available to the user i is denoted by Bi := {b ∈ B : b(i) = 1}.
2Rates and entropies in this paper are expressed in units of log |F| bits.
4An (n,R, (Rb : b ∈ B)) scheme consists of an encoding function φ and N decoding functions {ψi}i∈[N ]. The
encoding function
φ :
∏
i∈[N ]
Fn ×
∏
b∈B
[|F|nRb ] −→ [|F|nR], (1)
outputs the random variable M = φ
(
Xn[N ],KB
)
. For i ∈ [N ], the decoding function
ψi : [|F|nR]×
∏
j∈Ai
Fn ×
∏
b∈Bi
[|F|nRb ] −→ Fn. (2)
maps the message received from the transmission and the side information data to an estimate of the file needed at
user i
X̂ni := ψi
(
M,XnAi ,KBi
)
. (3)
Definition 1. A tuple (R, (Rb : b ∈ B)) is said to be achievable, if for each  > 0 there exists an (n,R, (Rb : b ∈ B))
scheme for some large enough n such that the following conditions are satisfied:
P
[
X̂ni = X
n
i , ∀i ∈ [N ]
]
≥ 1− , (4)
and
I
(
M ;Xn
[N ]\Ai
∣∣∣∣XnAi ,KBi
)
≤ n. (5)
For a private index coding problem represented by graph G, the rate region is defined as the closure of all
achievable rate tuples, and it is denoted by R(G). Two quantities of interest for a private index coding problem are
the optimal transmission rate and the sum key rate which are defined next.
Definition 2. For a private index coding problem represented by graph G, the the optimal transmission rate R∗(G)
is defined as
R∗(G) = min{R : (R, (Rb : b ∈ B)) ∈ R(G) for some (Rb : b ∈ B)}.
For a rate tuple ~R = (R, (Rb : b ∈ B)), the sum key rate is defined as SumKeyRate(~R) :=
∑
b∈B Rb. The
minimum sum key rate SumKeyRate∗(G) is defined as
SumKeyRate∗(G) := min
~R∈R(G)
SumKeyRate(~R).
Definition 3. The key access structure of a private index code, denoted by B∗, is the set of indices corresponding
to keys with non-zero rates, i.e., B∗ = {b ∈ B : Rb > 0}.
A key access structure B∗ is said to be feasible for a private index coding problem represented by graph G if
there exists a point in R(G) with Rb = 0 for all b /∈ B∗.
We define a stronger notion of perfect private index coding where the decoding and privacy conditions are not
asymptotic.
Definition 4. For a private index coding problem represented by graph G, an (n,R, (Rb : b ∈ B)) scheme is said
to be a perfect private index code if the decoding error and privacy leakage at all users are simultaneously zero,
i.e.,
Decoding Condition:
P
[
X̂ni = X
n
i , ∀i ∈ [N ]
]
= 1 (6)
Privacy condition: At each user i ∈ [N ],
I
(
M ;Xn
[N ]\Ai
∣∣∣∣XnAi ,KBi
)
= 0. (7)
All the private index coding schemes described in the paper indeed achieve this stronger notion of perfect privacy
and the converses are shown for the weaker notion of asymptotic privacy as previously defined. A scheme which
satisfies (6) and (7) with n = 1 is called a scalar private index code.
5III. FEASIBILITY OF PRIVATE INDEX CODING
In private index coding, achieving (4) and (5) relies on the availability of certain keys among users. Hence, the
feasibility of private index coding depends on the key access structure (e.g., see Fig. 1). The following theorem
characterizes the feasible key access structures for a private index coding problem.
X1, X2, K10
Server
X1 ⊕K10
X2
X2, K10
X2X1
(a) Feasible
1 2
X1 X2
K01X2
X1, X2, K01
Server
1 2
(b) Infeasible
Fig. 1. Figure (a) shows a feasible key access structure along with a code that achieves privacy. Figure (b) shows an infeasible key access
structure. Here, it can be seen that any encoding that allows users 1 and 2 to decode X1 and X2, respectively, also allows user 2 to decode
X1, breaking the privacy condition at user 2.
Theorem 1. A key access structure B∗ is feasible if and only if ∀ i, j ∈ [N ] such that i /∈ Aj , there exists a b ∈ B∗
such that bi = 1, bj = 0.
Theorem 1 shows that if user j does not have Xi as side information, then user i should have a key that is not
available with user j to preserve privacy. And also that, if all users satisfy this condition, then we can obtain a
private index code. The full proof of this theorem is provided in the Appendix A. Here we give an outline of the
proof of this result for perfect private index coding. The general result is shown in a similar way.
a) If part: Let Xi ∈ F, for all i ∈ [N ]. We consider a scheme which uses N independent copies of each key
in the given key access structure, i.e., ∀b ∈ B∗,Kb ∈ FN . For i ∈ [N ], similar to the definition of Bi, we define
B∗i = {b ∈ B∗ : b(i) = 1}, i.e., B∗i is the subset of keys in the key access structure that is available to user i. For
a representation of Kb as an N -length vector, let K
(i)
b denote the i
th co-ordinate of the vector. The transmission
M ∈ FN , where ith transmission M (i), i ∈ [N ], is given by
M (i) = Xi +
∑
b∈B∗i
K
(i)
b . (8)
From M (i), user i can decode Xi since she has Kb (specifically, K
(i)
b ) for all b ∈ B∗i . This scheme also satisfies
the privacy condition (7) since if i /∈ Aj , then, by assumption, user j does not have K(i)b for some b ∈ B∗i , and it
acts as one-time pad for the message Xi against user j. We note that this scheme is linear, and a formal proof of
the privacy condition follows using Theorem 2. For details, see Appendix A.
b) Only if part: For an n block length perfect private index code, we show that if i /∈ Aj , then the rate of
the keys that user i has and user j does not have, given by H(KB∗i \B∗j ), is lower bounded by H(X
n
i ). From the
privacy condition (7) at user j, it follows that
I
(
M ; Xn
[N ]\Aj
∣∣∣∣XnAj ,KB∗j
)
= 0.
By the decoding condition (6) at user j, Xnj is a function of (M,X
nAj ,KB∗j ), hence
I
(
Xnj ,M ; X
n
[N ]\Aj
∣∣∣∣XnAj ,KB∗j
)
= 0. (9)
Since i /∈ Aj , using the chain rule of mutual information, from (9) we obtain
I
(
M ; Xni
∣∣∣Xn[N ]\{i},KB∗j) = 0. (10)
6Using the fact that messages and keys are independent, it can be shown from (10) that
I
(
M ; Xni
∣∣∣Xn[N ]\{i},KB∗j∩B∗i ) = 0. (11)
By the decoding condition (6) for user i,
I
(
M ;Xni
∣∣∣Xn[N ]\{i},KB∗i ) = H (Xni ) . (12)
Thus, we have
I
(
M ;KB∗i \B∗j
∣∣∣Xn[N ]\{i}, Xni ,KB∗j∩B∗i ) = I (M ;KB∗i \B∗j , Xni ∣∣∣Xn[N ]\{i},KB∗j∩B∗i ) (13)
≥ I
(
M ;Xni
∣∣∣Xn[N ]\{i},KB∗i )
= H (Xni ) , (14)
where (13) follows from (11), and (14) follows from (12). Since I
(
M ;KB∗i \B∗j
∣∣∣Xn[N ]\{i}, Xni ,KB∗j∩B∗i ) ≤
H(KB∗i \B∗j ), and since H(X
n
i ) > 0, it follows from (14) that Rb is non-zero for some b ∈ B∗i \ B∗j .
IV. LINEAR PRIVATE INDEX CODES
In this section, we consider linear coding schemes for perfect private index coding. In Theorem 2, we characterize
linear schemes that satisfy the decoding (6) and privacy (7) conditions.
In the context of linear coding, for block length n ≥ 1, let Xi denote the row-vector corresponding to Xni and
let Kb denote the key uniformly distributed in FnRb . The linear encoder is of the form
MT =
∑
i∈[N ]
GiX
T
i +
∑
b∈B
HbK
T
b , (15)
where M ∈ Fr, Gi ∈ Fr×n for i ∈ [N ], and Hb ∈ Fr×nRb for b ∈ B. Transmission rate R is said to be achievable
if for some n ≥ 1 there exists a scheme such that R = r/n and it satisfies (6) and (7). If n = 1, the scheme is
called a scalar linear code.
Theorem 2. A linear encoding scheme is a valid perfect private index coding scheme if and only if it satisfies the
following conditions for each i ∈ [N ],
1) Let Gi =
[
G
(1)
i . . .G
(n)
i
]
, then for each 1 ≤ k ≤ n,
G
(k)
i /∈ 〈{Gj |j /∈ Ai} ∪ {Hb|b /∈ Bi}〉,
2) 〈{Gj |j /∈ Ai}〉 ⊆ 〈{Hb|b /∈ Bi}〉.
Here 〈.〉 denotes the linear span of column vectors.
Proof: The first condition is the necessary and sufficient condition for the decodability of Xi from the linear
code at user i using XAi and KBi as side information.
The second condition is the necessary and sufficient condition for privacy at user i. Suppose the condition is not
satisfied, then 〈{Gj |j /∈ Ai}〉 has a non zero projection onto the space orthogonal to 〈{Hj |j /∈ Bi}〉. But this space
is a subspace of 〈G1, . . .GN , {Hj |j ∈ Bi}〉. Hence by projecting the transmitted message onto this space, user i
may obtain a non-zero linear function of X
[N ]\Ai , hence the privacy condition (7) does not hold at user i. The
transmitted message can be written as
MT =
∑
j∈Ai
GjX
T
j +
∑
b∈Bi
HbK
T
b +
 ∑
j∈[N ]\Ai
GjX
T
j +
∑
b/∈Bi
HbK
T
b
 .
If the second condition is satisfied for i, then
∑
j∈[N ]\AiGjX
T
j lies in the subspace
∑
b/∈BiHbKTb . But,∑
b/∈BiHbKTb is independent of X[N ] and KBi and is uniformly distributed in the space spanned by Hb,b /∈ Bi.
Hence, the sum in the brackets is distributed uniformly in the vector space irrespective of the value of X[N ],KBi .
This implies that M is independent of X
[N ]\Ai conditioned on XAi ,KBi , hence the privacy condition is satisfied
at user i.
7Side info. graph G Rate Region R(G) Vertices of R(G) A private index code achieving the vertex
1 2
3
R100 +R101 ≥ 1
R010 +R110 ≥ 1
R001 +R011 ≥ 1
R ≥ 2
R+R011 ≥ 3
R+R101 ≥ 3
R+R110 ≥ 3
Rb ≥ 0,b ∈ B
(2, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1) X1 +X2 +K101 +K110, X2 +X3 +K110 +K011
(3, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0) X1 +K101, X2 +K110, X3 +K001
(3, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1) X1 +K101, X2 +K010, X3 +K011
(3, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0) X1 +K101, X2 +K010, X3 +K001
(3, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1) X1 +K100, X2 +K110, X3 +K011
(3, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0) X1 +K100, X2 +K110, X3 +K001
(3, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1) X1 +K100, X2 +K010, X3 +K011
(3, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0) X1 +K100, X2 +K010, X3 +K001
TABLE I
FOR THE 3 USER PRIVATE INDEX CODING PROBLEM G, EVERY VERTEX OF THE POLYTOPE R(G) CAN BE ACHIEVED USING SCALAR
LINEAR PIC. IN THE TABLE, THE VERTICES ARE REPRESENTED AS TUPLES (R,R100, R010, R110, R001, R101, R011).
V. RATE OF PRIVATE INDEX CODING
A. Connection to Index Coding Rate
We first show a simple connection between private index coding and index coding (without privacy) for the same
side information structure. Given a zero-error index coding scheme (specifically, an optimal scheme) of block-length
n, we describe a perfect private index code (for a certain key access structure we specify below) with the same
transmission rate:
For i ∈ [N ], let bi ∈ {0, 1}N denote the characteristic vector of the set Ai. We choose Kbi of the same rate
as Xni (i.e., Kbi is uniform in Fn). Not that Kbi is available to all users in Ai. Taking {Xni +Kbi , i ∈ [N ]} as
the messages, the given index coding scheme can be employed to deliver Xni +Kbi to user i, i ∈ [N ]; note that
user i has access to side-information {Xnj +Kbj : j ∈ Ai} as required. Having access to Kbi , user i can recover
Xni . Privacy follows from the fact that Kbi is unavailable to any user who should not learn X
n
i . Thus, the optimal
transmission rate of the index coding problem is also achievable using perfect private index codes for a certain key
access structure.
Given a private index coding scheme, it is easy to see, using an averaging argument, that there exists an assignment
of values to the keys which gives an index code which guarantees decoding error no more than that in the private
index code at each user. From this observation it is clear that the minimum transmission rate of private index coding
cannot be less than that achieved by asymptotic index coding. Since rate of asymptotic index coding coincides with
zero-error index coding [28], we have the following observation.
Theorem 3. For a given side information structure, optimal transmission rates of zero-error index coding and
private index coding (optimized over key access structures and key rates) are the same.
B. Rate Region of Small Private Index Coding Problems
The following theorem shows that when N ≤ 3, rate region of private index coding can be characterized.
Theorem 4. For every private index coding problem G with at most 3 users, the rate region R(G) is achievable
using scalar linear codes and time sharing.
A full proof of this theorem and the characterization of the rate region for every private index coding problem
with N ≤ 3 is presented in the Appendix B. Here we illustrate the proof method by characterizing the rate region of
perfect private index codes for an example. Consider the side information graph given in Table I. We first show the
necessity of the constraints on the rates. In arguing the “only if” part of Theorem 1 we showed that if i /∈ Aj , then∑
b∈Bi\Bj Rb ≥ H(Xni ). The first three inequalities in the table follow from this using H(Xni )/n = 1, i = 1, 2, 3.
To see the next inequality, note that the transmission rate of a private index code is lower bounded by the rate of
the index coding problem for the same side information graph. Hence, R is lower bounded by number of vertices
in the maximum acyclic induced subgraph [2], which is 2 in this example. To show the next inequality, we use the
8bound H (M) ≥ I(M ;Xn1 , Xn2 , Xn3 ,K001, . . . ,K110) and expand the mutual information term as follows,
I (M ;Xn2 ,K100,K110,K101)+I (M ;X
n
1 |Xn2 ,K100,K110,K101)+I (M ;K001,K011|Xn1 , Xn2 ,K100,K110,K101)
+ I (M ;Xn3 |Xn1 , Xn2 ,K100,K110,K101,K001,K011) + I
(
M ;K010
∣∣∣Xn[3],K100,K110,K101,K010,K011) . (16)
We lower bound the first and the third terms in the expression by zero. The decodability condition at user 1 implies
that the second term is H(Xn1 ). Using the independence of keys and messages, the fourth term can be written as
I (M ;Xn3 |Xn1 ,K101,K001,K011)
(a)
= H(Xn3 ),
where (a) follows from the decodability condition at user 3. To bound the fifth term in the expression (16), we note
that
I
(
M ;K010
∣∣∣Xn[3],K100,K110,K101,K010,K011)+H (K110) ≥ I (M ;K010,K110∣∣∣Xn[3],K100,K101,K010,K011)
(a)
=I
(
K100,K010,K011;K010,K110
∣∣∣Xn[3])+ I (M ;K010,K110∣∣∣Xn[3],K100,K101,K010,K011)
=I
(
K100,K010,K011,M ;K010,K110
∣∣∣Xn[3],K101) ≥ I (M ;K010,K110∣∣∣Xn[3],K101) (b)≥ H (Xn2 ) .
Here, (a) follows from the independence of files and keys and (b) follows from (14) with i = 2 and j = 3, since
2 /∈ A3. Hence, the fifth term in (16) can be lower bounded by H(Xn2 ) − H(K110). Putting all these together
we have H(M) ≥ ∑i∈[3]H(Xni ) − H(K110) which implies that R ≥ 3 − R110, similarly we get the next two
inequalities. The table shows that the vertices of the polygon described by these inequalities can be achieved using
scalar linear codes. In the appendix we show this for all graphs with up to 3 vertices, thereby proving the theorem.
In the case of 4 users, we have the following theorem, the proof of which can be found in Appendix C.
Theorem 5. There is a 4 user private index coding problem where a vector linear code obtains a rate tuple outside
the rate region obtained by scalar linear coding and time sharing.
C. A Polymatroidal Outer Bound
The outer bounds we used in establishing the rate regions of all private index coding problems with up to 3
users in Theorem 4 can be generalized. The following theorem provides an outer bound for private index coding by
generalizing the polymatroidal bound for the rate of index coding that was proposed in [6].
Theorem 6. A private index coding rate of (R,Rb : b ∈ B) is achievable for G only if there exists a function
f : 2[N ] × 2B → R≥0 such that the following conditions are satisfied.
f ([N ],B) = 0, (17)
f (∅, ∅) ≤ R, (18)
f (S, T ) ≥ f (S ′, T ′) if S ⊆ S ′, T ⊆ T ′ (19)
For disjoint sets S,S ′,S ′′ ⊆ [N ], T , T ′, T ′′ ⊆ B,
f (S, T )− f (S ∪ S ′′, T ∪ T ′′)
≤ f (S ∪ S ′, T ∪ T ′)− f (S ∪ S ′ ∪ S ′′, T ∪ T ′ ∪ T ′′) (20)
f (Ai,Bi)− f
(Ai,Bi) ≥ 1,∀i ∈ [N ], (21)
f
(Ai,Bi)− f ([N ],Bi) = 0, ∀i ∈ [N ], (22)
f ([N ],B \ T ) ≤
∑
b∈T
Rb, ∀T ⊆ B. (23)
Proof: To be more explicit, we will denote the files, keys and transmitted message in an (n,R,Rb : b ∈ B)
scheme by Xni : i ∈ [N ], Knb : b ∈ B and Mn, respectively. If a rate of (R,Rb : b ∈ B) is achievable, then there
is a sequence of (n`, R,Rb : b ∈ B)`∈N schemes such that for each ` ∈ N, when ` = 1` ,
P
[
X̂n`i = X
n`
i ,∀i ∈ [N ]
]
≥ 1− ` and I
(
Mn` ;Xn`
[N ]\Ai
∣∣∣∣Kn`Bi , Xn`Ai
)
≤ n``,∀i ∈ [N ]. (24)
9In the proof, we will use a sub-sequence of the above sequence corresponding to block-lengths (n`)`∈S (where S is
an infinite subset of N) that has the convergence property defined below.
Definition 5. A sequence of private index coding schemes of block-lengths (n`)`∈S (where S is an infinite subset of
N) is said to be convergent if the sequence
(
1
n`
H
(
Mn`
∣∣∣Xn`S ,Kn`T ))`∈S converges for each T ⊆ B and S ⊆ [N ].
Note that such a convergent sub-sequence always exists. This is because, since the rate of all schemes in the above
sequence is (R,Rb : b ∈ B), for every block length n in the sequence and every set T ⊆ B, 1nH
(
Mn
∣∣∣Xn[N ],KnT )
can be upper bounded as
1
n
H
(
Mn
∣∣∣Xn[N ],KnT ) ≤ 1nH (Mn) ≤ R. (25)
Consider the convergent sub-sequence of private index coding schemes corresponding to block-lengths (n`)`∈S
described above. For S ⊆ [N ] and T ⊆ B, we define f(S, T ) as
f(S, T ) := lim
`→∞
1
n`
I
(
Mn` ;Xn`
[N ]\S ,K
n`B\T | X
n`S ,K
n`T
)
.
Since the sub-sequence we consider is convergent, the limits in the definition of f is well defined. Equality (17) is
trivially true. Inequality (18) can be shown as follows.
f(∅, ∅) = lim
`→∞
1
n`
I
(
Mn` ;Xn`[N ],K
n`B
)
≤ lim
`→∞
1
n`
H (Mn`) = R.
Inequality (19) is a direct consequence of the chain rule of mutual information. By definition of f , when S,S ′,S ′′
and T , T ′, T ′′ are disjoint,
f(S, T )− f(S ∪ S ′′, T ∪ T ′′) = lim
`→∞
1
n`
I
(
Mn` ;Xn`S ′′ ,K
n`
T ′′
∣∣∣Xn`S ,Kn`T ) ,
and
f(S ∪ S ′, T ∪ T ′)− f(S ∪ S ′ ∪ S ′′, T ∪ T ′,∪T ′′) = lim
`→∞
1
n`
I
(
Mn` ;Xn`S ′′ ,K
n`T 3
∣∣∣Xn`S∪S ′ ,Kn`T 1∪T ′) .
Inequality (20) now follows from the following lemma when S1,S2,S3,S4 are replaced by S ′′, ∅,S,S ′, respectively
and T 1, T 2, T 3, T 4 are replaced by T ′′, ∅, T , T ′, respectively. The proof of the lemma is provided in Appendix A.
Lemma 1. Let S1,S2,S3,S4 be disjoint subsets of [N ] and T 1, T 2, T 3, T 4 be disjoint subsets of {0, 1}N \ {~1,~0}.
Then,
I
(
Mn;XnS1∪S2 ,K
nT 1∪T 2
∣∣∣XnS3∪S4 ,KnT 3∪T 4) ≥ I (Mn;XnS1 ,KnT 1∣∣∣XnS3 ,KnT 3) .
We now prove inequalities (21) and (22). For i ∈ [N ],
f(Ai,Bi)− f(Ai,Bi) = lim
`→∞
1
n`
I
(
Mn` ;Xn`i
∣∣∣Xn`Ai ,Kn`Bi) .
and
f(Ai,Bi)− f([N ],Bi) = lim
`→∞
1
n`
I
(
Mn` ;Xn`
[N ]\Ai
∣∣∣∣Xn`Ai ,Kn`Bi
)
.
We state a lemma which immediately implies inequalities (21) and (22). The proof of the lemma is provided in
Appendix A.
Lemma 2. For block-length n,  > 0 and i ∈ [N ], if
I
(
M ;Xn
[N ]\Ai
∣∣∣∣XnAi ,KBi
)
≤ n,
P
[
ψi
(
M,XnAi ,KBi
)
6= Xni
]
≤ ,
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then, when h(.) denotes the Boolean entropy function, i.e., h() =  log|F|
1
 + (1 − ) log|F| 11− , for sufficiently
small values of ,
I
(
M ;Xn
[N ]\Ai
∣∣∣∣XnAi ,KBi
)
≤ 3nh() (26)
I
(
M ;Xni
∣∣∣XnAi ,KBi) ≥ H (Xni )− 3nh(). (27)
By the conditions in (24), for ` ∈ S, ` → 0 as `→∞ and, consequently, h(`)→ 0. Hence, using Lemma 2,
inequalities (21) and (22) can be obtained by taking `→∞ such that ` ∈ S.
Finally, to see (23), for every T ⊆ B,
f([N ],B \ T ) = lim
n`
1
n`
H
(
Mn`
∣∣∣X`[N ],Kn`B\T )− 1n`H
(
Mn`
∣∣∣Xn`[N ],Kn`B )
= lim
n`
1
n`
I
(
Mn` ;Kn`T
∣∣∣Xn`[N ],Kn`B\T )
≤ lim
n`
1
n`
·H
(
Kn`T
)
=
∑
b∈T
Rb.
Remark 1. We may recover the polymatroidal bound for index coding rate of [5, Theorem 5.1] (for equal sized
files) as a special case of the bound given in the above theorem. Define f ′ : 2[N ] → R≥0 as f ′(S) = f([N ] \ S,B).
Theorem 6 imposes the following inequalities of f ′.
f ′(∅) = 0 (28)
f ′([N ]) ≤ R (29)
f ′(J ) ≤ f ′(K) if J ⊆ K (30)
f ′(J ∩ K) + f ′(J ∪ K) ≤ f ′(J ) + f ′(K) (31)
f ′([N ] \ Ai)− f ′([N ] \ Ai) ≥ 1,∀i ∈ [N ]. (32)
Here, f ′([N ]) = f(∅,B) ≤ f(∅, ∅) ≤ R. Inequality (31) is obtained from rearranging the inequality (20) after
setting S = [N ] \ (J ∪ K),S ′ = J \ K,S ′′ = K \ J , T = B and T ′, T ′′ = ∅. Inequality (32) is implied by the
inequalities (21) and (19). It can be verified that this is indeed the constraint on transmission rate implied by the
polymatroidal inner bound when all files are of the same size.
VI. SUM KEY RATE
In this section, we discuss our results on the minimum sum key rate. To this end, we first give definitions of
some well-known graph theoretic quantities.
A. Graph-theoretic definitions
Consider a graph G and assign a color to each vertex in its vertex set V (G), such that no two neighboring
vertices share the same color. The minimum number of colors required is called the chromatic number of graph G,
which we denote by χ(G).
Definition 6. Let [L] = {1, · · · , L} be a set of L colors. Let each v ∈ V (G) be assigned a subset of colors of size b
of the set [L] such that any two adjacent nodes get disjoint sets. Such an assignment is called a b-fold coloring and
the minimum L for which a b-fold coloring exists is called the b-fold chromatic number of G, denoted by χb(G).
Definition 7. The fractional chromatic number χf (G) of a graph G is defined as
χf (G) = lim
b→∞
χb(G)
b
= inf
b
χb(G)
b
.
It is easy to verify that χb(G) is subadditive. Thus, the limit exists.
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Fig. 2. A private index coding problem for which the minimum sum key rate is strictly larger than the minimum transmission rate and
strictly smaller than the fractional chromatic number of its complement. This shows that both the bounds in Theorem 7 can be simultaneously
loose.
B. Bounds on the Minimum Sum Key Rate
Recall the definition of SumKeyRate∗(G) from Definition 2. In Theorem 7, we give upper and lower bounds on
SumKeyRate∗(G).
Theorem 7. For a private index coding problem represented by graph G, SumKeyRate∗(G) always satisfies the
following:
R∗(G)− 1 ≤ SumKeyRate∗(G) ≤ χf (Gc). (33)
The upper bound on SumKeyRate∗(G) follows by showing that if Gc has an n-fold coloring using C colors,
then G has a private index code with sum key rate and transmission rate C/n. To show the lower bound, we first
argue that if the index coding problem satisfies that for every i ∈ [N ], there exists a j ∈ [N ], such that i /∈ Aj , then
SumKeyRate∗(G) is lower bounded by the optimal transmission rate R∗(G). We then generalize this result to any
arbitrary side information structure to obtain the lower bound in (33). The full proof of Theorem 7 can be found in
Appendix D.
Next we show that the bounds on SumKeyRate∗(G) in Theorem 7 are loose in general using the following
example.
Example 1. Consider the graph G shown in Fig. 2. The complement graph Gc of G is also isomorphic to G. Since
any two nodes in Gc are connected, it follows that χ(Gc) = χf (Gc) = 5. Now consider the following linear private
index code.
X1 +X2 +X3 +K10010 +K11001,
X2 +X3 +X4 +K11001 +K01110,
X3 +X4 +X5 +K01110 +K00101.
It can be verified that this linear code satisfies the conditions in Theorem 2 and is thus a perfect private index
code. The sum key rate of this code is 4 which is strictly less than χf (Gc) = 5. This shows that the upper bound in
Theorem 7 is loose in general. In Appendix D, we show that the minimum sum key rate is strictly larger than 3,
while the minimum transmission rate is clearly at most 3 as the scheme constructed shows. This further implies that
the lower bound in Theorem 7 is not tight.
A natural question that arises given these observations is whether there is a trade-off between the transmission
rate and the sum key rate. From the proof of Theorem 3, it is clear that the optimal transmission rate may be
achieved with a sum key rate of N . Up to 3 users, the minimum sum key rate and the optimal transmission rate
for any private index coding problem can be achieved simultaneously. Whether this is indeed the case in general
remains open. In the next subsection, we discuss a related but different trade-off, the one between the transmission
rate and the size of the key access structure.
C. Trade-off between the transmission rate and the size of key access structure
For a given a key access structure B∗, we refer to the cardinality of B∗ as the size of key access structure B∗.
Next, we give an example to show that there indeed exists a trade-off between the transmission rate and the size of
the key access structure.
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Fig. 3. A private index coding problem for which there is a trade-off between the size of the key access structure and the optimal transmission
rate. The transmission rate for every feasible key access structure with 3 keys is at least 3 while the optimal transmission rate is 2.5.
Example 2. The minimum transmission rate of private index codes for the graph G in Fig. 3 is at least 3 for any
key access structure B∗ such that |B∗| ≤ 3. We prove this in Appendix D.
On the other hand, the following scheme with block length 2 achieves a lower transmission rate of 2.5 for a key
access structure B∗ such that |B∗| = 5. For i ∈ [5], let X(1)i and X(2)i denote the first and second co-ordinates of
X2i , respectively. The server makes five transmissions as described below.
X
(1)
1 +X
(1)
2 +K11000,
X
(1)
3 +X
(1)
4 +K00110,
X
(1)
5 +X
(2)
1 +K10001,
X
(2)
2 +X
(2)
3 +K01100,
X
(2)
4 +X
(2)
5 +K00011.
Using Theorem 2, it is easy to verify that this scheme satisfies the decodability and privacy conditions. The
transmission rate is clearly 2.5 which is strictly less than the transmission rate achievable using a key access
structure of size at most 3. This demonstrates that there exists a trade-off between the transmission rate and the size
of the key access structure.
VII. PRIVATE AND PUBLIC RANDOMNESS IN PRIVATE INDEX CODING
In this section, we consider general private index coding schemes with randomized encoder and decoders with
common randomness available at the server and all the users (CREDPIC). We would like to note that the common
randomness can be thought of as a key available to the server and all the users and private randomness at encoder
as key available only to the server, which could be treated as K~1 and K~0, respectively. Since we are not interested
in the rate of common and private randomness, instead of treating them like keys, we treat the common randomness
and private randomness at encoder (denoted by W and Wφ, respectively) similar to private randomness of decoders
(denoted by Wψi , for user i ∈ [N ]). We show that the rate region of such schemes is no larger that the the rate
region of private index codes (PIC) as defined in Section II.
Formal definitions of general private index coding schemes with randomized encoder and decoders that use
common randomness and its different variations follow.
Definition 8. A CREDPIC scheme (Private Index Coding scheme with Common randomness and Randomness at
Encoder and Decoder) of rate (R,Rb : b ∈ B) and block length n is a private index coding scheme with randomized
encoder and decoder that uses common and private randomness described by an encoder
φ :
∏
i∈[N ]
Fn ×
∏
b∈B
[|F|nRb ]×W ×Wφ −→ [|F|nR], (34)
and decoder ψi for each user i ∈ [N ] described as,
ψi : [|F|nR]×
∏
j∈Ai
Fn ×
∏
b∈Bi
[|F|nRb ]×W ×Wψi −→ Fn. (35)
Here, W,Wφ and Wψi : i ∈ [N ] are arbitrarily large finite sets.
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Private randomness
at decoders
Common randomness
(encoder and decoders)
Private randomness
at Encoder
Zero-error
decoding
CREDPIC X X X ×
CREPIC × X X ×
REPIC × × X ×
zero-error REPIC × × X X
PIC × × × ×
TABLE II
A SUMMARY OF THE VARIATIONS OF PRIVATE INDEX CODES THAT USE RANDOMNESS TO VARYING DEGREES.
CREDPIC
Maximum
likelihood
decoding
Lemma 3
CREPIC
Averaging
argument
Lemma 4
REPIC
Hybrid
coding
Lemma 5
zero-error REPIC
Channel
simulation
Lemma 6
PIC
Fig. 4. Theorem 8 is proved in four stages by showing that the rate regions of different variants of private index coding schemes coincide.
The common randomness W available to all users and the server is uniformly distributed in W , the private
randomness Wφ of the server and Wψi of user i are uniformly distributed in Wφ and Wψi , respectively. We
define the random variables corresponding to the transmitted message and the estimate of Xni computed by user i,
respectively, as
M := φ
(
Xn[N ],KB,W,Wφ
)
and X̂ni := ψi
(
M,XnAi ,KBi ,W,Wψi
)
.
For , δ ≥ 0, the above described encoder φ and decoders ψi : i ∈ [N ] constitute a (n, , δ)-CREDPIC scheme of
rate (R,Rb : b ∈ B) if the following decoding and privacy conditions are satisfied.
-Decoding error: P
[
X̂ni = X
n
i ,∀i ∈ [N ]
]
≥ 1− , (36)
δ-Privacy error: I
(
M ;Xn
[N ]\Ai
∣∣∣∣KBi , XnAi ,W
)
≤ nδ, for all i ∈ [N ]. (37)
Rate (R,Rb : b ∈ B) is said to be achievable using CREDPIC schemes if for every  > 0, there exists a (n, , )-
CREDPIC scheme for a large enough block-length n.
Several variations of private index codes of the same rate that use private and common randomness to varying
extends are defined below. These definitions will be crucially used in proving that the rate region of CREDPIC and
PIC coincide. A summary of the definitions is provided in Table II.
• If Wψi = ∅ for all i ∈ [N ], i.e., decoders do not use private randomness, the above scheme is said to be
(n, , δ)-CREPIC (Private Index Coding scheme with Common randomness and Randomness at Encoder).
• If, additionally, W = ∅, i.e., the scheme does not use common randomness, the above scheme is said to be
(n, , δ)-REPIC(Private Index Coding scheme with Randomness at Encoder).
• (n, δ)-zero-error REPIC denotes (n, 0, δ)-REPIC.
• If, additionally, Wφ = ∅, i.e., the encoder does not use private randomness, the above scheme is said to be
(n, , δ)-PIC(Private Index Coding scheme with Randomness at Encoder). This coincides with our definition of
private index codes given in Section II.
Achievability using CREPIC,REPIC and zero-error REPIC schemes are defined similarly as the achievability for
CREDPIC.
Theorem 8. For any side information structure G, the rate region of PIC is identical to the rate region of CREDPIC.
Proof: The theorem is proved in four stages, summarized in Figure 4. Lemmas 3 and 4 show that the use
of randomization at decoder and/or using common randomness do not enhance the rate region. We will use this
observation to show in Lemma 5 that the rate region of zero-error REPIC coincides with that of CREDPIC. Finally,
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Lemma 6 shows that the rate region of zero-error REPIC is identical to that of PIC. Clearly, these lemmas imply
the statement of the theorem.
The following two lemmas show that the rate region of CREDPIC,CREPIC and REPIC are identical for a given
side information structure.
Lemma 3. Given an (n, , δ)-CREDPIC scheme for a side information structure G, one can construct an (n, , δ)-
CREPIC scheme of the same rate for G.
Proof: Note that the privacy condition at a user does not depend on the decoding function. Hence, the private
randomness at the decoders may be removed by using a maximum likelihood decoder so that the decoding error
remains at most . It is worth noting that this argument cannot be used to transform a randomized encoder into a
deterministic one, since fixing the randomness at the encoder will directly affect the privacy condition.
Lemma 4. Given an (n, , δ)-CREPIC scheme for a side information structure G, one can construct an (n, 2, 2Nδ)-
REPIC scheme of the same rate for G.
This is proved by showing the existence of a realization of the common randomness for which the decoding error
is at most 2 (Condition 36) and privacy leakage is 2Nδ (Condition 37). The lemma follows from this observation
since we may fix the common randomness to be this realization. Detailed proof is given in Appendix E. The
following corollary follows from the above two lemmas.
Corollary 1. For G, if a rate (R,Rb : b ∈ B) is achievable using CREDPIC schemes, then this rate is also
achievable using REPIC schemes.
Lemma 5. If a rate of (R,Rb : b ∈ B) is achievable using CREDPIC schemes, then for every δ > 0, a rate of
(R+ δ,Rb : b ∈ B) is achievable using zero-error REPIC schemes.
Given Corollary 1, it is sufficient to show that for any δ > 0, a rate of (R+ δ,Rb : b ∈ B) is achievable using
zero-error REPIC schemes if a rate of (R + δ,Rb : b ∈ B) is achievable using REPIC schemes. Fix δ > 0; for
every  > 0, for a large enough block-length n, we show that a (n, , )-REPIC scheme of rate (R,Rb : b ∈ B) can
be transformed into a (n, 3N)-zero-error REPIC scheme of rate (R+ δ,Rb : b ∈ B). Clearly, such a construction
will imply the lemma.
The new zero-error REPIC scheme is a hybrid code that uses the given REPIC scheme and a non-private zero-error
index code. An informal description of the construction follows. For a given realization of files and keys, the
sender checks if the transmitted message computed by the encoder of the (n, , )-REPIC scheme can be decoded
correctly by all users (this can be done since decoders are deterministic). In this case, the output of the encoder is
transmitted after appending enough zeros to ensure that the transmission rate is R+ δ′(value of δ′ will be decided
later). Otherwise, the sender uses a zero-error (non-private) index code of rate R+ δ′ instead of the original scheme.
Index code with this rate can be constructed for large enough n by Theorem 3 and the fact that asymptotic index
coding rate and zero-error index coding rate are same [28]. With a single bit as prefix to the transmitted message,
the sender can indicate to the receivers whether to use the original scheme or the index coding scheme for decoding.
It is easy to verify that the decoding error is zero for this scheme. The privacy leakage of the new scheme is
comparable to the given scheme. This is because, loosely speaking, the new scheme leaks more information than
the original scheme only when it uses the index coding scheme instead of the original scheme for encoding; but the
probability of this event is small since the original scheme has low decoding error. By choosing δ′ appropriately
we can ensure that after adding the prefix bit, the rate is (R+ δ,Rb : b ∈ B). A formal proof which includes the
construction of a zero-error index code that is required in the proof is given in Appendix E.
It follows from the previous lemma that to prove Theorem 8, we only need to show that the rate region of
zero-error REPIC schemes is identical to that of PIC schemes. We now state the lemma which immediately implies
this identification.
Lemma 6. If a rate of (R,Rb : b ∈ B) is achievable using zero-error REPIC schemes, then for every δ > 0, the
rate (R+ δ,Rb : b ∈ B) is achievable using PIC schemes.
We prove the lemma using the following claim which constructs a PIC scheme from a given zero-error REPIC
scheme.
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Claim 1. For  > 0, If there is a (n, )-zero-error-REPIC scheme of rate (R,Rb : b ∈ B) with encoder φ that uses
private randomness Wφ and decoders ψi for user i ∈ [N ], then for any δ > 0, and a large enough m, there exists
a (mn, 2, 2N′)-PIC scheme of rate (R′ + δ,Rb : b ∈ B), where
′ = 4
1
2
+R+N +
∑
b∈B
Rb +
1
mn
· log 1

 and nR′ = I (φ(Xn[N ],KB,Wφ) ;Xn[N ],KB) .
The lemma follows directly from the above claim since ′ → 0 as → 0 and
R′ =
1
n
× I
(
φ
(
Xn[N ],KB,Wφ
)
;Xn[N ],KB
)
≤ 1
n
×H
(
φ
(
Xn[N ],KB,Wφ
))
= R.
The construction in the claim may be informally described as follows. In the (n, )-zero-error-REPIC scheme, the
encoder φ can be thought of as the channel from X[N ],KB to the transmitted message φ
(
X[N ],KB
)
. The randomness
in the channel is exactly the private randomness of the encoder viz. Wφ. We use results from channel simulation to
approximately compress multiple independent uses of this channel using appropriately large common randomness [29].
The rate of such a compression can be made arbitrarily close to 1n × I
(
φ
(
Xn[N ],KB,Wφ
)
;Xn[N ],KB
)
. As long
as this approximation is close, the decoding error will be small since zero-error REPIC has zero decoding error.
It can also be shown that the privacy error of the approximation is not much larger than . The PIC scheme is
obtained by removing the common randomness introduced by the channel simulation scheme. By Lemma 4 such a
transformation does not increase decoding error or privacy parameter substantially. The detailed proof of this claim
is provided in the Appendix E.
Role of Private Randomness in Perfect Private index Coding: It is not clear whether private randomness at the
encoder helps in enhancing the rate region of perfect private index codes. However, for linear perfect private index
coding, this question is answered in the negative, in the following lemma. The proof of this lemma is provided in
Appendix E.
Lemma 7. The rate region of linear perfect private index coding is not enhanced by the use of private randomness
at encoder.
We leave the usefulness of private randomness in general perfect private index coding open.
VIII. WEAK PRIVACY
Theorem 1 shows that if the goal is to achieve the privacy required by (4), then, in all but trivial cases, we need
to distribute keys among the users. In this section, we consider a model without the extra resource of keys. In the
absence of keys, we aim to achieve weak privacy. An (n,R) scheme consists of an encoding function φ and N
decoding functions {ψi}i∈[N ]. The encoding function
φ :
∏
i∈[N ]
Fn −→ [|F|nR], (38)
outputs the random variable M = φ
(
Xn[N ]
)
. For i ∈ [N ], the decoding function
ψi : [|F|nR]×
∏
j∈Ai
Fn −→ Fn (39)
maps the message received from the transmission and the side information data to an estimate of the file needed at
user i
X̂ni := ψi
(
M,XnAi
)
. (40)
Rate R is said to be achievable under weak privacy, if for each  > 0 there exists an (n,R) scheme for some large
enough n such that the following conditions are satisfied:
P
[
ψi
(
M,XnAi
)
= Xni ,∀i ∈ [N ]
]
≥ 1− , (41)
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and
I
(
M ;Xnj
∣∣∣XnAi) ≤ n for all i ∈ [N ], j ∈ [N ] \ Ai. (42)
Observe that under weak privacy defined by (42), if user i does not have Xj and Xk as side information, where
i 6= j 6= k, then user i must not learn anything about Xj or Xk individually, but the user may gain some information
about the pair (Xj , Xk).
A. Feasibility of Weak Privacy
It is not possible to achieve weak privacy for all index coding problems. For example, Fig. 5 shows a feasible
index coding problem and an infeasible index coding problem under weak privacy. For the 4 user network in the left,
transmitting X1⊕X2 and X3⊕X4 is a scheme under weak privacy. For the 3 user network in the right, decodability
at user 3 implies that for all  > 0 and for large enough n, we have H (Xn3 |M,Xn1 , Xn2 ) ≤ n. But from the privacy
condition at user 2, we have I (M,Xn1 , X
n
2 ;X
n
3 ) ≤ n which further implies that H (Xn3 |M,Xn1 , Xn2 ) ≥ n(1− ).
So, there is no scheme for this network. Next we study the feasibility of index coding under weak privacy. We
X1
X3
X4
X1
X2
X3
X4
X2
X1 ⊕X2
X3 ⊕X4
X1X2X3X4
X2X3
X1
X1X2
X1
X2
X3
(a) (b)Feasible Infeasible
X1X2X3
Fig. 5. Figure (a) shows a feasible index coding instance under weak privacy along with a code that achieves weak privacy. Figure (b)
shows an index coding instance where the weak privacy condition at user 2 cannot be met for any code that allows all users to decode their
requested file.
first give some necessary conditions that the network should satisfy in order to be feasible. We start with a simple
subset condition that any pair of nodes should satisfy in order to be feasible.
Lemma 8 (Subset Condition). An index coding problem under weak privacy is not feasible if the following holds:
There exist users i, j ∈ [N ], i 6= j such that i /∈ Aj and Ai ⊆ Aj .
The proof of Lemma 8 follows from the fact that if Ai ⊆ Aj , then user j can obtain Xi using the broadcast
message and the side information since user i obtains Xi and user knows/recovers everything that user i knows.
Thus, weak privacy is violated if i /∈ Aj . The proof is given in Appendix F-A. Even if there are no two users
{3, 4}
{1, 2}
{2, 3, 5}
1
3
6
Fig. 6. A private index coding instance that is infeasible although it satisfies the condition in Lemma 8.
i, j ∈ [N ] for which the condition in Lemma 8 is satisfied, weak privacy may not be feasible. We show this using
the example depicted in Fig. 6. In this example, there are 6 users and the side information for users 1,3 and 6 are
shown. Further, let Ai = [N ] \ {i} for i = 2, 4, 5. It is easy to verify that for any two users i, j ∈ [6], the condition
in Lemma 8 does not hold. However, in Appendix F-B, we show the following.
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Claim 2. There is no scheme under weak privacy for the private coding instance in Fig. 6.
Next we give an improved necessary condition for feasibility.
Theorem 9. If there exists a user i ∈ [N ] such that the following condition holds, then index coding under weak
privacy is not feasible:
For any S ⊆ Ai such that i ∈ S, there exists a user j ∈ [N ], i 6= j and a k ∈ S such that k /∈ Aj and S \{k} ⊆ Aj .
Theorem 9 subsumes Lemma 8 as explained next. Suppose there exist i, j ∈ [N ] for which the condition in
Lemma 8 holds. Then for any S ⊆ Ai such that i ∈ S, it holds that for user j and k = i, k /∈ Aj and S \ k ⊆ Aj .
The proof of Theorem 9 uses the following idea. If the condition in Theorem 9 is satisfied, then there exists a
j ∈ [N ] such that i /∈ Aj which follows by taking S = {i}. Then we cannot transmit Xi without any coding since
it violates weak privacy at user j. If Xi is conveyed to user i by encoding Xi using some side information of user
i, then by the given condition, we can show that it violates the weak privacy at some user. The formal proof is
given in Appendix F-C.
1 2 3
4 5
Fig. 7. For the graph, {{1, 2, 4}, {3, 5}} is a secure clique cover, i.e., {1, 2, 4} and {3, 5} are cliques which together contains all the
vertices such that the vertices 3 and 5 have only one outgoing edge to {1, 2, 4}, and the vertices 1, 2 and 4 have two outgoing edges to {3, 5}.
Next we give a sufficient condition to achieve weak privacy. Towards that, we first give the definition of a secure
clique cover. A clique is a subset of vertices where every two vertices within which are adjacent, and a clique cover
is a set of cliques which cover all the vertices, i.e., each vertex is in at least one of the cliques.
Definition 9 (Secure clique cover). A clique cover CG of G is said to be secure if it satisfies the condition that
any v ∈ V (G) is in exactly one of the cliques in CG and for any c ∈ CG with |c| = k, there does not exist a
v ∈ V (G) \ c such that v has exactly k − 1 outgoing edges to the nodes in c.
Observe that {{1, 2, 4}, {3, 5}} is a clique cover for the graph shown in Fig. 7. It is also a secure clique cover
since nodes 3 and 5 do not have two edges to the clique {1, 2, 4}, and the nodes 1, 2 and 4 have two edges to the
clique {3, 5}. Transmission of X1 ⊕X2 ⊕X4 and X3 ⊕X5 gives a scheme under weak privacy for this example.
We have the following theorem.
Theorem 10. For the index coding problem represented by G, weak privacy is feasible if G has a secure clique
cover.
{2, 3, 7}
{3, 4, 6}
{4, 5, 7}
{1, 6, 7}
{1, 2, 4}
{1, 3, 5}
{2, 5, 6}
3
1
2
4
5
6
7
Fig. 8. A private index coding instance that is feasible using a linear scheme but it has no secure clique cover.
The achievability scheme to show Theorem 10 is linear and the proof is given in Appendix F-D. In the next
subsection, we study linear coding schemes to achieve weak privacy. A characterization of all linear schemes which
achieve weak privacy is given in Theorem 11. We show using an example (Fig. 8) that having a secure clique cover
is not a necessary condition to obtain weak privacy. For this example, we give a linear scheme which satisfies
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the conditions in Theorem 11. But it can be verified that the example shown in Fig. 8 has no secure clique cover.
Details are given in Appendix F-E.
B. Perfect Linear Index Coding under Weak Privacy
We consider linear coding schemes under weak privacy which satisfies (41) and (42) with  = 0. Then, linear
encoding for weak privacy is similar to (15) with only the first term involving Gis. In Theorem 11, we characterize
the linear schemes that satisfy the perfect decoding and weak privacy conditions. We use the same notations that we
used to describe linear coding in Section IV. The proof of Theorem 11 is along similar lines as that of Theorem 2,
hence it is omitted.
Theorem 11. The matrices (Gi)i∈[N ] is a valid encoding scheme under weak privacy if and only if they satisfy the
following conditions for each i ∈ [N ],
1) gki /∈ 〈{Gj}j /∈Ai〉, for 1 ≤ k ≤ n,
2) For j /∈ Ai, 〈Gj〉 ⊆ 〈{Gk}k/∈Ai〉.
IX. PRIVACY THROUGH MULTICASTS
We consider a model in which there is no shared key between the server and the users. However, the server can
multicast to any subset of users. A multicast session is defined as transmitting one element from field F to a subset
of users. A multicast scheme MK with K sessions consists of K subsets Sk ⊆ [N ], k = 1, . . . ,K, an encoder for
each session:
φ(k) :
∏
i∈[N ]
Fn −→ F (43)
and a decoder for each user i
ψi :
∏
i∈Sk
F×
∏
j∈Ai
Fn −→ Fn. (44)
In the kth session, the server multicasts the message Mk = φ(k)
(
Xn[N ]
)
to the subset Sk of users. Let M(i) denote
the set of messages that user i gets from K multicast sessions, i.e.,
M(i) = {Mk : i ∈ Sk}.
User i decodes X̂ni := ψi
(
M(i), XnAi
)
. A multicast scheme is said to be a perfect private multicast index code
if
P
[
ψi
(
M(i), XnAi
)
= Xni , ∀i ∈ [N ]
]
= 1,
and for each user i ∈ [N ],
I
(
M(i);Xn
[N ]\Ai
∣∣∣∣XnAi
)
= 0.
For a multicast scheme, we are interested in determining the minimum number of multicast sessions required. Let
κn(G) denote the minimum number of multicast sessions required at block length n. We define κ(G) , infn κn(G)n .
A characterization of κ(G) is given in the next theorem which shows that for the index coding problem represented
by G, κ(G) is given by the fractional chromatic number (Definition 7) of Gc.
Theorem 12. For the index coding problem represented by G, κ(G) = χf (Gc).
To prove Theorem 12, we first show that from any multicast scheme given for block length n, we can obtain
an n-fold coloring (Definition 6) of Gc. Further, we also show that a multicast scheme for block length n can be
obtained from any n-fold coloring of Gc. Formal proof is given in Appendix G.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The following lemma is used several places in the following. The proof of the lemma follows from the independence
of the messages and keys.
Lemma 1. Let S1,S2,S3,S4 be disjoint subsets of [N ] and T 1, T 2, T 3, T 4 be disjoint subsets of {0, 1}N \ {~1,~0}.
Then,
I
(
M ;XnS1∪S2 ,KT 1∪T 2
∣∣∣XnS3∪S4 ,KT 3∪T 4) ≥ I (M ;XnS1 ,KT 1∣∣∣XnS3 ,KT 3) .
Proof: By assumption, the sets S1,S2,S3,S4 are disjoint among themselves and so are T 1, T 2, T 3, T 4. Since
messages and keys are independent of other messages and keys, it follows that
(
XnS1 ,KT 1
)
,
(
XnS2∪S4 ,KT 2∪T 4
)
and
(
XnS3 ,KT 3
)
are independent. So, we have
I
(
XnS2∪S4 ,KT 2∪T 4 ;X
nS1 ,KT 1
∣∣∣XnS3 ,KT 3) = 0. (45)
Then, we obtain
I
(
M ;XnS1∪S2 ,KT 1∪T 2
∣∣∣XnS3∪S4 ,KT 3∪T 4) ≥ I (M ;XnS1 ,KT 1∣∣∣XnS2∪S3∪S4 ,KT 2∪T 3∪T 4)
= I
(
M ;XnS1 ,KT 1
∣∣∣XnS2∪S3∪S4 ,KT 2∪T 3∪T 4)
+ I
(
XnS2∪S4 ,KT 2∪T 4 ;X
nS1 ,KT 1
∣∣∣XnS3 ,KT 3) (46)
= I
(
M,XnS2∪S4 ,KT 2∪T 4 ;X
nS1 ,KT 1
∣∣∣XnS3 ,KT 3)
≥ I
(
M ;XnS1 ,KT 1
∣∣∣XnS3 ,KT 3) (47)
where in (46) we used (45). Thus, we have the lemma.
We use the following two lemmas in proving Theorem 1.
Lemma 2. For block-length n,  > 0 and i ∈ [N ], if
I
(
M ;Xn
[N ]\Ai
∣∣∣∣XnAi ,KBi
)
≤ n, (48)
P
[
ψi
(
M,XnAi ,KBi
)
6= Xni
]
≤ , (49)
then, when h(.) denotes the Boolean entropy function, i.e., h() =  log|F|
1
 + (1 − ) log|F| 11− , for sufficiently
small values of ,
I
(
M ;Xn
[N ]\Ai
∣∣∣∣XnAi ,KBi
)
≤ 3nh() (50)
I
(
M ;Xni
∣∣∣XnAi ,KBi) ≥ H (Xni )− 3nh(). (51)
Proof: Applying Fano’s inequality to (49), we get
H
(
Xni
∣∣∣XnAi ,KBi ,M) ≤ h() + H (Xni ) ≤ h() + n. (52)
Then,
I
(
Xni ;X
n
[N ]\Ai
∣∣∣XnAi ,KBi ,M) ≤ H (Xni ∣∣∣XnAi ,KBi ,M) ≤ h() + n. (53)
Hence,
I
(
M ;Xn
[N ]\Aj
∣∣∣∣XnAj ,KBj
)
≤ I
(
Xni ,M ;X
n
[N ]\Ai
∣∣∣∣XnAi ,KBi
)
(a)
≤ h() + 2n.
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Here, (a) follows from the above inequalities (53) and (48). Furthermore,
I
(
M ;Xni
∣∣∣XnAi ,KBi) = H (Xni ∣∣∣XnAi ,KBi)−H (Xni | XnAi ,KBi ,M) ≥ H (Xni )− h()− n.
Here, the inequality follows from the independence of Xni and
(
Xn[N ]\{i},KBi
)
and the inequality (52). For
sufficiently small values of , the RHS of both the above inequalities can be bounded as h() + 2n ≤ 3n · h(),
since h() ≥ . This proves the lemma.
Lemma 9. Suppose i, j ∈ [N ] such that i /∈ Aj . For sufficiently small  > 0, if the privacy condition (4) and
decoding conditions (5) are satisfied for block-length n, then
I
(
M ;KnBi\Bj
∣∣∣Xn[N ],KnBi∩Bj) ≥ H (Xni )− 6nh().
Proof: By the privacy and decoding conditions, we have
I
(
M ;Xn
[N ]\Ai
∣∣∣∣XnAi ,KBi
)
≤ n,
P
[
ψi
(
M,XnAi ,KBi
)
6= Xni
]
≤ ,
for all i ∈ [N ]. By inequality (50) in Lemma 2,
I
(
M ;Xn
[N ]\Aj
∣∣∣∣XnAj ,KBj
)
≤ 3nh() (a)=⇒ I
(
M ;Xni
∣∣∣Xn[N ]\{i},KBj) ≤ 3nh()
(b)
=⇒ I
(
M ;Xni
∣∣∣Xn[N ]\{i},KBj∩Bi) ≤ 3nh(). (54)
Here (a) follows from chain rule and the assumption that i /∈ Aj and (b) follows from Lemma 1. By inequality (51)
in Lemma 2,
I
(
M ;Xni
∣∣∣XnAi ,KBi∩Bj ,KBi\Bj) ≥ H (Xni )− 3nh()
=⇒ I
(
M ;Xni
∣∣∣Xn[N ]\{i},KBi∩Bj ,KBi\Bj) ≥ H (Xni )− 3nh(), (55)
where the implication follows by Lemma 1. Then,
I
(
M ;KBi\Bj
∣∣∣Xn[N ],KBi∩Bj) (a)≥ I (M ;Xni ∣∣∣Xn[N ]\{i},KBi∩Bj)− 3nh()
+ I
(
M ;KBi\Bj
∣∣∣Xn[N ],KBi∩Bj)
= I
(
M ;Xni ,KBi\Bj
∣∣∣Xn[N ]\{i},KBi∩Bj)− 3nh()
≥ I
(
M ;Xni
∣∣∣Xn[N ]\{i},KBi∩Bj ,KBi\Bj)− 3nh()
(b)
≥ H (Xni )− 6nh(), (56)
where (a) follows from (54) and (b) follows from (55).
We first show the necessity of the condition in Theorem 1.
( =⇒ )
For a given key access structure B∗, for i ∈ [N ], let B∗i represent the set of keys in B∗ that are available at user
i, i.e., B∗i = {b ∈ B∗ : b(i) = 1}. Since for every block length n,
H
(
KB∗i \B∗j
)
≥ I
(
M ;KB∗i \B∗j
∣∣∣Xn[N ],KB∗i∩B∗j)
and since i /∈ Aj , from Lemma 9 it follows that for sufficiently small  > 0, there exists a block-length n such that,
H
(
KB∗i \B∗j
)
≥ H (Xni )− 6nh(),
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or, ∑
b∈B∗i \B∗j
H (Kb) ≥ H (Xni )− 6nh().
Since h()→ 0 as → 0, from the above observation, we get∑
b∈B∗i \B∗j
Rb ≥ H (Xi) .
Since H(Xi) > 0, this implies that there is a key Kb with non-zero rate that is available at user i and not available
at user j.
Next we show that if the key access structure satisfies the condition in Theorem 1, then we may construct a
private index coding scheme.
(⇐= )
Let B∗ be a key access structure that satisfies the conditions in Theorem 1. We assume that the alphabet of
Xi, i ∈ [N ] is a field F and that of keys Kb,b ∈ B∗ is the vector space FN . We denote the ith component of the
key Kb by Kib. Let ei, i ∈ [N ] be the vector in FN , with 1 as the ith component and other values being 0. This is
the ith column of an N ×N matrix over F. When we set M = [M1, . . .MN ]T , the scheme described in (8) may
represented as follows
M =
∑
i∈[N ]
ei
Xi + ∑
b∈B∗i
Kib
 . (57)
Comparing this with the general linear encoder described in (15), we see that Gi = [ei] for i ∈ [N ] and that
Hb = [{ei}i:bi=1] for any b ∈ B∗. For i ∈ [N ], if b /∈ B∗i then ei /∈ 〈Hb〉. From these observations, it can be seen
that for any i ∈ [N ],
〈ei〉 /∈ 〈{Gj}j /∈Ai , {Hb}b/∈B∗i 〉.
Hence, our scheme satisfies the first condition in Theorem 2.
Let i, j ∈ [n] such that i /∈ Aj , then by our assumption B∗i \B∗j is non-empty. Let b ∈ B∗i \B∗j , then bi = 1, hence
ei ∈ 〈Hb〉 = 〈{e`}`:b`=1〉.
Since Gi = [ei],
〈Gi〉 ⊆ 〈Hb〉 ⊆ 〈{Hb}b/∈B∗j 〉.
Thus, the second condition in Theorem 2 is also satisfied. Hence this is a valid linear (perfect) private index code.
This proves Theorem 1.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Proof of the Theorem 4: Tables III and IV list all the graphs on 2 and 3 vertices respectively (up to isomorphism)
and characterize their rate region. For each graph G, the second column lists the inequalities that describe the rate
region, R(G), which turns out be a polygon. The vertices of the polygon thus described are listed in the third
column of the table. Note that the achievable rate region for each of these graphs is necessarily contained in these
polygons. One can verify that these are indeed the vertices by checking that these points satisfy all the listed
inequalities and that at least 7 inequalities are satisfied with equalities. The fourth column presents scalar linear
private index coding schemes that achieve the rate tuples represented by each of these vertices. It can be easily
verified that these schemes satisfy the conditions in Theorem 2 and hence are valid linear (perfect) private index
codes.
In the rest of this section we show the necessity of the inequalities given in the second column. From the decoding
condition (4) and privacy condition (5), we obtain two kinds of inequalities: ones that bound the key rates and
others that bound the rate of transmission. First we describe the kind of inequalities that bound the key rates.
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Side info. graph G Rate Region R(G) Vertices of R(G) A private index code achieving the vertex
1 2
R10, R01 ≥ 0
R10 ≥ 1
R01 ≥ 1
R ≥ 2
(2, 1, 1) X1 +K10, X2 +K01
1 2
R10, R01 ≥ 0
R10 ≥ 1
R ≥ 2
(2, 1, 0) X1 +K10, X2
1 2
R10, R01 ≥ 0
R ≥ 1
(1, 0, 0) X1 +X2
TABLE III
CHARACTERIZATION OF RATE REGIONS OF ALL PRIVATE INDEX CODING PROBLEMS WITH 2 USERS. THE RATE REGION IS ACHIEVABLE
USING SCALAR LINEAR PRIVATE INDEX CODES. IN THE TABLE, THE VERTICES ARE REPRESENTED AS TUPLES (R,R10, R01).
a) Bounds on key rates: To describe the lower bounds on the rate region, we use two kinds of bounds on key
rates. These bounds are general and can be used for any N and are described in the following claims.
Claim 3. If i, j ∈ [N ] are users such that i /∈ Aj , i.e., in the directed graph G(V,E) corresponding to the private
index coding problem, (j, i) /∈ E, then, ∑
b∈Bi\Bj
Rb ≥ 1.
Proof: If i /∈ Aj , we have shown in the proof of Theorem 1, that∑
b∈Bi\Bj
Rb ≥ H (Xi) .
The claim follows by substituting H(Xi) = 1 for all i ∈ [N ].
Claim 4. If i, j, ` ∈ [N ] are users such that i /∈ Aj and i, j /∈ A`, i.e., in the directed graph G(V,E) corresponding
to the private index coding problem, (j, i), (`, i), (`, j) /∈ E, then∑
b∈(Bi∪Bj)\B`
Rb ≥ 2.
Proof: The proof for this claim is similar to the previous one. For a given  > 0, there exists large enough
block-length n such that the decoding condition and privacy conditions are satisfied, i.e.,
P
[
ψi
(
M,XnAi ,KBi
)
= Xni , i ∈ [N ]
]
≥ 1− ,
I
(
M ;Xn
[N ]\Ai
∣∣∣∣XnAi ,KBi
)
≤ n, for all i ∈ [N ].
Applying Fano’s inequality to the decodability condition of user `, we have
H
(
Xn`
∣∣∣XnA(`),KB` ,M) ≤ h() + n ≤ 2nh().
The last inequality follows from h() being at least  for sufficiently small  > 0. Hence, from the above condition
and the privacy condition for user `,
I
(
Xn` ,M ;X
n
[N ]\A`
∣∣∣∣XnA` ,KB`
)
≤ I
(
M ;Xn
[N ]\A`
∣∣∣∣XnA` ,KB`
)
+H
(
Xn`
∣∣∣XnA(`),KB` ,M)
≤ h() + 2nh() ≤ 3nh()
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Side info. graph G Rate Region R(G) Vertices of R(G) A private index code achieving the vertex
1 2
3
Rb ≥ 0,b ∈ B
R100 +R101 ≥ 1
R100 +R110 ≥ 1
R010 +R110 ≥ 1
R010 +R011 ≥ 1
R001 +R011 ≥ 1
R001 +R101 ≥ 1
R001 +R101 +R100 ≥ 2
R001 +R011 +R010 ≥ 2
R100 +R110 +R010 ≥ 2
R ≥ 3
(3, 0, 0, 2, 0, 2, 2) X1 +K101 +K110, X2 +K
′
110 +K011,
X3 +K
′
011 +K
′
101
(3, 0, 0, 2, 1, 1, 1) X1 +K101 +K110, X2 +K
′
110 +K011,
X3 +K001
(3, 0, 1, 1, 0, 2, 1) X1 +K101 +K110, X2 +K010,
X3 +K011 +K
′
101
(3, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0) X1+K101+K110, X2+K010, X3+K001
(3, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 2) X1 +K001, X2 +K110 +K011,
X3 +K
′
011 +K101
(3, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1) X1+K100, X2+K110+K011, X3+K001
(3, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1) X1+K100, X2+K010, X3+K011+K101
(3, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0) X1 +K100, X2 +K010, X3 +K001
1 2
3
Rb ≥ 0,b ∈ B
R100 +R101 ≥ 1
R100 +R110 ≥ 1
R010 +R110 ≥ 1
R001 +R011 ≥ 1
R001 +R101 ≥ 1
R001 +R101 +R100 ≥ 2
R100 +R110 +R010 ≥ 2
R ≥ 3
(3, 0, 0, 2, 0, 2, 1) X1 +K101 +K110, X2 +K
′
110,
X3 +K011 +K
′
101
(3, 0, 0, 2, 1, 1, 0) X1+K101+K110, X2+K
′
110, X3+K001
(3, 0, 1, 1, 0, 2, 1) X1 +K101 +K110, X2 +K010,
X3 +K011 +K
′
101
(3, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0) X1+K101+K110, X2+K010, X3+K001
(3, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1) X1+K001, X2+K110, X3+K011+K101
(3, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0) X1 +K100, X2 +K110, X3 +K001
(3, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1) X1+K100, X2+K010, X3+K011+K101
(3, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0) X1 +K100, X2 +K010, X3 +K001
1 2
3
Rb ≥ 0,b ∈ B
R100 +R101 ≥ 1
R100 +R110 ≥ 1
R010 +R110 ≥ 1
R001 +R101 ≥ 1
R001 +R101 +R100 ≥ 2
R100 +R110 +R010 ≥ 2
R ≥ 3
(3, 0, 0, 2, 0, 2, 0) X1+K101+K110, X2+K
′
110, X3+K
′
101
(3, 0, 0, 2, 1, 1, 0) X1+K101+K110, X2+K
′
110, X3+K001
(3, 0, 1, 1, 0, 2, 0) X1+K101+K110, X2+K010, X3+K
′
101
(3, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0) X1+K101+K110, X2+K010, X3+K001
(3, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0) X1 +K001, X2 +K110, X3 +K101
(3, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0) X1 +K100, X2 +K110, X3 +K001
(3, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0) X1 +K100, X2 +K010, X3 +K101
(3, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0) X1 +K100, X2 +K010, X3 +K001
1 2
3
Rb ≥ 0,b ∈ B
R100 +R110 ≥ 1
R010 +R110 ≥ 1
R001 +R011 ≥ 1
R001 +R101 ≥ 1
R ≥ 2
R+R110 ≥ 3
(2, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1) X1 +X2 +K110, X3 +K011 +K101
(2, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0) X1 +X2 +K110, X3 +K001
(3, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1) X1+K100, X2+K010, X3+K011+K101
(3, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0) X1 +K100, X2 +K010, X3 +K001
1 2
3
Rb ≥ 0,b ∈ B
R100 +R101 ≥ 1
R100 +R110 ≥ 1
R010 +R110 ≥ 1
R001 +R011 ≥ 1
R001 +R101 +R100 ≥ 2
R ≥ 3
(3, 0, 0, 2, 0, 1, 1) X1+K101+K110, X2+K
′
110, X3+K011
(3, 0, 0, 2, 1, 1, 0) X1+K101+K110, X2+K
′
110, X3+K001
(3, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1) X1+K101+K110, X2+K010, X3+K011
(3, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0) X1+K101+K110, X2+K010, X3+K001
(3, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1) X1 +K001, X2 +K110, X3 +K011
(3, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0) X1 +K100, X2 +K110, X3 +K001
(3, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1) X1 +K100, X2 +K010, X3 +K011
(3, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0) X1 +K100, X2 +K010, X3 +K001
1 2
3
Rb ≥ 0,b ∈ B
R100 +R110 ≥ 1
R010 +R110 ≥ 1
R001 +R011 ≥ 1
R ≥ 2
R+R110 ≥ 3
(2, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1) X1 +X2 +K110, X3 +K011
(2, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0) X1 +X2 +K110, X3 +K001
(3, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1) X1 +K100, X2 +K010, X3 +K011
(3, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0) X1 +K100, X2 +K010, X3 +K001
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Side info. graph G Rate Region R(G) Vertices of R(G) A private index code achieving the vertex
1 2
3
Rb ≥ 0,b ∈ B
R100 +R101 ≥ 1
R100 +R110 ≥ 1
R001 +R011 ≥ 1
R001 +R101 ≥ 1
R001 +R101 +R100 ≥ 2
R ≥ 3
(3, 0, 0, 1, 0, 2, 1) X1+K101+K110, X2, X3+K011+K
′
101
(3, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0) X1 +K101 +K110, X2, X3 +K001
(3, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1) X1 +K001, X2, X3 +K101 +K101
(3, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0) X1 +K100, X2, X3 +K001
1 2
3
Rb ≥ 0,b ∈ B
R100 +R101 ≥ 1
R100 +R110 ≥ 1
R001 +R101 ≥ 1
R001 +R101 +R100 ≥ 2
R ≥ 3
(3, 0, 0, 1, 0, 2, 0) X1 +K101 +K110, X2, X3 +K
′
101
(3, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0) X1 +K101 +K110, X2, X3 +K001
(3, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0) X1 +K001, X2, X3 +K101
(3, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0) X1 +K100, X2, X3 +K001
1 2
3
Rb ≥ 0,b ∈ B
R100 +R110 ≥ 1
R010 +R110 ≥ 1
R ≥ 2
R+R110 ≥ 3
(2, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0) X1 +X2 +K110, X3
(3, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0) X1 +K100, X2 +K010, X3
1 2
3
Rb ≥ 0,b ∈ B
R010 +R110 ≥ 1
R001 +R011 ≥ 1
R001 +R101 ≥ 1
R ≥ 2
R+R110 ≥ 3
(2, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1) X1 +X2 +K110, X3 +K101 +K011
(2, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0) X1 +X2 +K110, X3 +K001
(3, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1) X1, X2 +K010, X3 +K011
(3, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0) X1, X2 +K010, X3 +K001
1 2
3
Rb ≥ 0,b ∈ B
R100 +R101 ≥ 1
R010 +R011 ≥ 1
R ≥ 2
R+R101 +R011 ≥ 3
(2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1) X1 +K101, X2 +X3 +K011
(2, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1) X1 +K100, X2 +X3 +K011
(2, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0) X2 +K010, X1 +X3 +K101
(3, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0) X1 +K100, X2 +K010, X3
1 2
3
Rb ≥ 0,b ∈ B
R100 +R101 ≥ 1
R010 +R110 ≥ 1
R001 +R011 ≥ 1
R ≥ 2
R+R110 ≥ 3
R+R101 ≥ 3
R+R011 ≥ 3
(2, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1) X1 +X2 +K110 +K101,
X2 +X3 +K110 +K011
(3, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0) X1 +K101, X2 +K110, X3 +K001
(3, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1) X1 +K101, X2 +K010, X3 +K101
(3, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0) X1 +K101, X2 +K010, X3 +K001
(3, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1) X1 +K100, X2 +K110, X3 +K011
(3, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0) X1 +K100, X2 +K110, X3 +K001
(3, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1) X1 +K100, X2 +K010, X3 +K011
(3, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0) X1 +K100, X2 +K010, X3 +K001
1 2
3
Rb ≥ 0,b ∈ B
R010 +R110 ≥ 1
R001 +R011 ≥ 1
R ≥ 2
R+R110 ≥ 3
(2, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1) X1 +X2 +K110, X3 +K011
(2, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0) X1 +X2 +K110, X3 +K001
(3, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1) X1, X2 +K010, X3 +K011
(3, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0) X1, X2 +K010, X3 +K001
1 2
3 Rb ≥ 0,b ∈ B
R001 +R011 ≥ 1
R001 +R101 ≥ 1
R ≥ 2
(2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1) X1 +X2, X3 +K101 +K011
(2, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0) X1 +X2, X3 +K001
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Side info. graph G Rate Region R(G) Vertices of R(G) A private index code achieving the vertex
1 2
3 Rb ≥ 0,b ∈ B
R010 +R110 ≥ 1
R ≥ 2
(2, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0) X1 +X2 +K110, X3
(2, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0) X1 +X3, X2 +K010
1 2
3
Rb ≥ 0,b ∈ B
R ≥ 1
(1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) X1 +X2 +X3
TABLE IV
RATE REGIONS OF ALL PRIVATE INDEX CODING PROBLEMS WITH 3 USERS. THE RATE REGION IS ACHIEVABLE USING SCALAR LINEAR
PRIVATE INDEX CODES. IN THE TABLE, THE VERTICES ARE REPRESENTED AS TUPLES (R,R100, R010, R110, R001, R101, R011).
Hence,
I
(
M ;Xn
[N ]\A`
∣∣∣∣XnA` ,KB`
)
≤ 3nh() (a)=⇒ I
(
M ;Xni , X
n
j
∣∣∣Xn[N ]\{i,j},KB`) ≤ 3nh()
(b)
=⇒ I
(
M ;Xni , X
n
j
∣∣∣Xn[N ]\{i,j},K(Bi∪Bj)∩B`) ≤ 3nh(). (58)
Here (a) follows from chain rule and our assumption that i, j /∈ A` and (b) follows from Lemma 1. Applying Fano’s
inequality on the decodability condition of user j, we have
H
(
Xnj
∣∣∣XnAj ,KBj ,M) ≤ h() + n ≤ 2nh().
But,
I
(
M ;Xni , X
n
j
∣∣∣Xn[N ]\{i,j},KBi∪Bj) = I (M ;Xnj ∣∣∣Xn[N ]\{i,j},KBi∪Bj)+ I (M ;Xni ∣∣∣Xn[N ]\{i},KBi∪Bj)
Since i /∈ Aj , Aj ⊆ [N ] \ {i, j},
I
(
M ;Xnj
∣∣∣Xn[N ]\{i,j},KBi∪Bj) = H (Xnj ∣∣∣Xn[N ]\{i,j},KBi∪Bj)−H (Xnj |M,Xn[N ]\{i,j},KBi∪Bj)
≥ H (Xnj )− 2nh().
Where the last inequality follows from the fact that the first term is equal to H(Xnj ) as X
n
j is independent of(
Xn[N ]\{i,j},KBi∪Bj
)
and the second term is at most 2nh() by the decodability condition at user j. Similarly,
since Ai ⊆ [N ] \ {i}, applying Fano’s inequality to decodability condition at user i, we have
I
(
M ;Xni
∣∣∣Xn[N ]\{i},KBi∪Bj) = H (Xni ∣∣∣Xn[N ]\{i},KBi∪Bj)−H (Xni ∣∣∣M,Xn[N ]\{i},KBi∪Bj)
≥ H (Xni )− 2nh().
Hence,
I
(
M ;Xni , X
n
j
∣∣∣Xn[N ]\{i,j},KBi∪Bj) ≥ H (Xni ) +H (Xnj )− 2nh(). (59)
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Fig. 9. Graphs G1, G2 and G3 used in the statements of Claims 6, 7 and 8, respectively.
Then,
H
(
K(Bi∪Bj)\B`
)
(a)
= H
(
K(Bi∪Bj)\B`
∣∣∣Xn[N ],K(Bi∪Bj)∩B`) ≥ I (M ;K(Bi∪Bj)\B`∣∣∣Xn[N ],K(Bi∪Bj)∩B`)
(b)
=I
(
M ;Xni , X
n
j
∣∣∣Xn[N ]\{i,j},K(Bi∪Bj)∩B`)+ I (M ;K(Bi∪Bj)\B`∣∣∣Xn[N ],K(Bi∪Bj)∩B`)− 3nh()
=I
(
M ;K(Bi∪Bj)\B` , Xni , Xnj
∣∣∣Xn[N ]\{i,j},K(Bi∪Bj)∩B`)− 3nh()
=I
(
M ;K(Bi∪Bj)\B`
∣∣∣Xn[N ]\{i,j},K(Bi∪Bj)∩B`)+ I (M ;Xni , Xnj ∣∣∣Xn[N ]\{i,j},KBi∪Bj)− 3nh()
(c)
≥H (Xni ) +H
(
Xnj
)− 5nh().
Where (a) follows from the independence of K(Bi∪Bj)\B` and
(
Xn[N ],K(Bi∪Bj)∩B`
)
, (b) follows from (58) and
(c) follows from (59). The result follows from this inequality by substituting H(Xni ) = n for i ∈ [N ] and taking 
to zero since h()→ 0 when → 0.
b) Bounds on transmission rate: We describe three bounds of this kind. Although the first bound in Claim 5
is applicable to any general private index coding problem, the latter three bounds apply specifically to N = 3.
Claim 5. The transmission rate of a private index coding scheme for a graph G is lower bounded by the number
of vertices in the maximum acyclic induced subgraph of G, denoted by MAIS(G).
Proof: The index coding rate for a graph G is bounded from below by MAIS(G) [2]. The claim follows from
the observation that a lower bound on the transmission rate for (non-private) index coding is also a lower bound for
the transmission rate for the private index coding.
Claim 6. If the graph of the private index coding problem is a subgraph of G1 given in Figure 9, then the
transmission rate is lower bounded as
R ≥ 3−R110.
Proof: For block length n, we have nR ≥ H(M) ≥ I(M ;Xn1 , Xn2 , Xn3 ,K001,K010,K100,K011,K101,K110),
but
I (M ;Xn1 , X
n
2 , X
n
3 ,K001, . . . ,K110) = I (M ;X
n
1 , X
n
2 ,K100,K101,K110)
+ I (M ;Xn3 ,K001,K011|Xn1 , Xn2 ,K100,K101,K110)
+ I (M ;K010|Xn1 , Xn2 , Xn3 ,K100,K101,K110,K001,K011) . (60)
The first term may be bounded as,
I (M ;Xn1 , X
n
2 ,K100,K101,K110) ≥ I (M ;Xn1 |Xn2 ,K100,K101,K110) = I
(
M ;Xn1
∣∣∣XnA1 ,KB1) .
Consider the second term,
I (M ;Xn3 ,K001,K011|Xn1 , Xn2 ,K100,K101,K110) ≥ I (M ;Xn3 |Xn1 , Xn2 ,K100,K101,K110,K001,K011)
(a)
≥ I (M ;Xn3 |Xn1 ,K101,K001,K011)
= I
(
M ;Xn3
∣∣∣XnA3 ,KB3) .
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Here, (a) follows from Lemma 1. The third term may be bounded as follows,
I
(
M ;K010
∣∣∣Xn[3],K100,K101,K110,K001,K011) = I (M ;K010,K110∣∣∣Xn[3],K100,K101,K001,K011)
− I (M ;K110|Xn1 , Xn2 , Xn3 ,K100,K101,K001,K011)
(a)
≥ I
(
M ;K010,K110
∣∣∣Xn[3],K011)
− I (M ;K110|Xn1 , Xn2 , Xn3 ,K100,K101,K001,K011)
(b)
≥ I
(
M ;KB2\B3
∣∣∣Xn[3],KB2∩B3)−H (K110) . (61)
Where, (a) follows from Lemma 1 and (b) follows from the subtracted mutual information term being upper bounded
by H(K110). From (60) and the bounds on each of its terms, we have
nR ≥ I
(
M ;Xn1
∣∣∣XnA1 ,KB1)+ I (M ;Xn3 ∣∣∣XnA3 ,KB3)+ I (M ;KB2\B3∣∣∣Xn[3],KB2∩B3)−H (K110) (62)
We have already established that for sufficiently small  > 0, there exists a large enough block length n such that
H
(
Xn1
∣∣∣XnA1 ,KB1 ,M) (a)≤ 2nh() =⇒ I (M ;Xn1 ∣∣∣XnA1 ,KB1) ≥ H (Xn1 )− 2nh(),
H
(
Xn3
∣∣∣XnA3 ,KB3 ,M) (b)≤ 2nh() =⇒ I (M ;Xn3 ∣∣∣XnA3 ,KB3) ≥ H (Xn3 )− 2nh(),
and
I
(
M ;KB2\B3
∣∣∣Xn[3],KB2∩B3) (c)≥ H(Xn2 )− 6nh().
Where (a) (respectively (b)) can be shown using Fano’s inequality and decoding condition at user 1 (respectively
user 3) and (c) follows from Lemma 9 since 2 /∈ A3. From the above observations and the inequality (62), we have
nR ≥ H (Xn1 ) +H (Xn3 ) +H (Xn2 )− h (K110)− 10nh().
Since for any block length n, H (Xni ) /n = 1 for all i ∈ [N ], the claim now follows from taking  to 0 .
Consider any subgraph H of G1. A private index coding scheme for side information structure H is a valid
private index coding scheme for G1 too. Hence this bound on the transmission rate applies the index coding schemes
for the subgraph too. This proves the claim.
Claim 7. If the graph of the private index coding problem is a subgraph of G2 given in Figure 9, then the
transmission rate is lower bounded as
R ≥ 3−R110.
Proof: Similar to the previous claim, for a block length n, we consider the quantity I(M ;Xn[3],K001, . . . ,K110)
which lower bounds H(M).
I (M ;Xn1 , X
n
2 , X
n
3 ,K001, . . . ,K110) = I (M ;X
n
3 ,K001,K011,K101)
+ I (M ;Xn1 , X
n
2 ,K100,K110|Xn3 ,K001,K011,K101)
+ I (M ;K010|Xn1 , Xn2 , Xn3 ,K001,K011,K101,K100,K110) . (63)
The first term may be bounded as follows,
I (M ;Xn3 ,K001,K011,K101) ≥ I (M ;Xn3 |K001,K011,K101) = I
(
M ;Xn3
∣∣∣XnA3 ,KB3) .
Note that here, A3 = ∅. Consider the second term,
I (M ;Xn1 , X
n
2 ,K100,K110|Xn3 ,K001,K011,K101) ≥ I (M ;Xn1 |Xn2 , Xn3 ,K001,K011,K101,K100,K110)
(a)
≥ I (M ;Xn1 |Xn2 , Xn3 ,K101,K100,K110)
= I
(
M ;Xn1
∣∣∣XnA1 ,KB1) .
28
Here, (a) follows from Lemma 1. We bound the last term identically as we did in the previous claim.
I
(
M ;K010
∣∣∣Xn[3],K100,K101,K110,K001,K011) = I (M ;K010,K110∣∣∣Xn[3],K100,K101,K001,K011)
− I (M ;K110|Xn1 , Xn2 , Xn3 ,K100,K101,K001,K011)
≥ I
(
M ;KB2\B3
∣∣∣Xn[3],KB2∩B3)−H (K110) .
From (63) and the bounds on each of its terms, we have
H (M) ≥ I
(
M ;Xn3
∣∣∣XnA3 ,KB3)+ I (M ;Xn1 ∣∣∣XnA1 ,KB1)+ I (M ;KB2\B3∣∣∣Xn[3],KB2∩B3)−H (K110) .
This is identical to the inequality 61 in the proof of Claim 6 since here also 2 /∈ A3. Hence, we obtain the bound
R ≥ 3−R110
the same way we obtained it in the previous claim. Since this bound on the transmission rate applies the index
coding schemes for the subgraphs too, the claim follows.
Claim 8. If the graph of the private index coding problem is a subgraph of G3 given in Figure 9, then the
transmission rate
RM ≥ 3−R101 −R011.
Proof: We have,
H (M) ≥ I
(
M ;Xn[3],K001, . . . ,K110
)
=I
(
M ;Xn[3],K001,K011,K101
)
+ I
(
M ;K100,K010,K110
∣∣∣Xn[3],K001,K011,K101) . (64)
We may bound the first term as,
I
(
M ;Xn[3],K001,K011,K101
)
≥ I (M ;Xn3 |Xn1 , Xn2 ,K001,K011,K101) = I
(
M ;Xn3
∣∣∣XnA3 ,KB3) . (65)
The second term
I
(
M ;K100,K010,K110
∣∣∣Xn[3],K001,K011,K101) = I (M ;K110∣∣∣Xn[3],K001,K011,K101)
+ I
(
M ;K010
∣∣∣Xn[3],K001,K011,K101,K110)
+ I
(
M ;K100
∣∣∣Xn[3],K001,K011,K101,K110,K010) . (66)
We lower bound the first term in (66) by 0. Consider the second term.
I
(
M ;K010
∣∣∣Xn[3],K001,K011,K101,K110) (a)≥ I (M ;K010∣∣∣Xn[3],K011,K110)
= I
(
M ;K010,K011
∣∣∣Xn[3],K110)− I (M ;K011∣∣∣Xn[3],K110)
(b)
≥ I
(
M ;KB2\B1
∣∣∣Xn[3],KB1∩B2)−H (K011) . (67)
Here, (a) follows from Lemma 1 and (b) follows from upper bounding the subtracted mutual information term by
H(K011). Similarly, third term of (66) may be bounded as
I
(
M ;K100
∣∣∣Xn[3],K001,K011,K101,K110,K010) ≥ I (M ;K100∣∣∣Xn[3],K101,K110)
= I
(
M ;K100,K101
∣∣∣Xn[3],K110)− I (M ;K101∣∣∣Xn[3],K110)
(b)
≥ I
(
M ;KB1\B2
∣∣∣Xn[3],KB1∩B2)−H (K101) . (68)
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34
Fig. 10. A 4 user private index coding problem for which the rate region cannot be achieved using time-sharing of scalar linear private
index codes.
Here, (a) follows from Lemma 1 and (b) follows from upper bounding the subtracted mutual information term by
H(K101). From the bounds (65), (67), (68) on the terms in the equality (64), we have
H (M) ≥ I
(
M ;Xn3
∣∣∣XnA3 ,KB3)
+ I
(
M ;KB2\B1
∣∣∣Xn[3],KB1∩B2)−H (K011)
+ I
(
M ;KB1\B2
∣∣∣Xn[3],KB1∩B2)−H (K101) .
For any  > 0, we have already seen that there exists a large enough block-length n such that,
I
(
M ;Xn3
∣∣∣XnA3 ,KB3) (a)≥ H (Xn3 )− 2nh(),
I
(
M ;KB2\B1
∣∣∣Xn[3],KB1∩B2) (b)≥ H (Xn2 )− 6nh(),
I
(
M ;KB1\B2
∣∣∣Xn[3],KB1∩B2) (c)≥ H (Xn1 )− 6nh().
Where (a) follows from the decodability condition at user 3, (b) and (c) follows from Lemma 9 since 2 /∈ A1 and
1 /∈ A2 respectively. The claim can now be obtained by taking  to zero.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 5
When N = 4, there exist private index coding problems where rate region cannot be achieved using scalar linear
codes and time sharing. Consider the private index coding for the graph G in Fig. 10. The following vector linear
scheme achieves the rate (R,R1001, R1010, R1100, R0101, R0101, R0011) = (2.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 1, 0.5, 0.5) when every
other key rate is 0
X11 +X
1
2 +K1100 +K
1
1001, X
1
2 +X
1
4 +K1100 +K
1
0101,
X22 +X
2
4 +K0110 +K
2
0101, X
2
4 +X
1
3 +K
2
0101 +K0011,
X21 +X
2
3 +K1010.
Here, Ki0101 is the ith independent bit of K
(2)
0101 and X
i
j is the ith bit of X
(2)
j . It can be verified that this vector
linear code satisfies the conditions in Theorem 2.
Next we show that this rate tuple cannot be achieved using scalar linear codes and time sharing. For this, it is
sufficient to show that, for any scalar linear code, when
(R1001, R1010, R1100, R0101, R0110, R0011) ≤ (1, 1, 1, 2, 1, 1)
and the rate of other keys are zero, the transmission rate of any scalar linear code is at least 3. To show a contradiction
let H ∈ F2×10q be a matrix that achieves transmission rate 2.
H = [v1 v2 v3 v4 v1001 v1010 v1100 v
1
0101 v
2
0101 v0110 v0011]
and the transmission M is,
M =
[
v1 v2 v3 v4 v1001 v1010 v1100 v
1
0101 v
2
0101 v0110 v0011
]
[X1,X2,X3,X4,K1001,K1010,K1100,K10101,K20101.K0110,K0011]
T
30
According to Theorem 2, for this scheme to be a private linear index code it should satisfy the following conditions,
v1 /∈ 〈v4 v10101 v20101 v0110 v0011〉, v2 /∈ 〈v1 v3 v1001 v1010 v0011〉,
v3 /∈ 〈v4 v1001 v1100 v10101 v20101〉, v4 /∈ 〈v2 v1010 v1100 v0110 〉,
〈v4〉 ∈ 〈v10101 v20101 v0110 v0011〉, 〈v1 v3〉 ∈ 〈v1001 v1010 v0011〉,
〈v4〉 ∈ 〈v1001 v1100 v10101 v20101〉, 〈v2〉 ∈ 〈v1010 v1100 v0110〉.
Since v1, . . . , v4 are non-zero two 2-dimensional vectors, v2 /∈ 〈v1 v3〉 implies that v1 = v3. v2 /∈ 〈v4〉 implies that
v2 6= v4 and finally the decoding condition at user 1 implies that v1 6= v4. Hence we conclude that v1, v2, v4 are
distinct and non-zero and that v1 = v3.
Statements v1 ∈ 〈v1001 v1010 v0011〉 and v4 /∈ 〈v2 v1010〉 imply that v1010 is either ~0 or v2. But, statement
v2 /∈ 〈v1 v3 v1010〉 implies that v1010 is either ~0 or v1. But since v1 and v2 are distinct, v1010 = ~0. v2 /∈
〈v1, v3, v1001, v1010, v0011〉, implies that v1001 is either ~0 or the same as v1 = v3 and that v0011 is either ~0 or the
same as v1 = v3. But since v1 /∈ 〈v0011〉, v0011 6= v1 and since v3 /∈ 〈v1001〉, v1001 6= v3. Hence we have that
v1001 = v1010 = v0011 = ~0. This is a contradiction since v1 is non-zero and v1 ∈ 〈v1001 v1010 v0011〉.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 7
To show the upper bound in Theorem 7, we use the next claim.
Claim 9. If Gc has an n-fold coloring using C colors, then G has a private index code with sum key rate and
transmission rate C/n.
Proof: An n-fold coloring of Gc can be given by assigning a number from [C] to each of the n components of
xni , i = 1, . . . , N such that no two adjacent vertices have the same colors. Let l
(
x
(k)
i
)
) denote the color given to
the kth co-ordinate of xni . For a given color c = 1, . . . , C of an n-fold coloring, let Sc denote the set of vertices
where color c is present, i.e.,
Sc =
{
i : l
(
x
(k)
i
)
= c for some k = 1, . . . , n
}
.
Consider the key access structure such that key Kbc ∈ F is shared between all the users in Sc for c = 1, . . . , C.
The server makes the following C transmissions{
Kbc +X
(k)
i : l
(
x
(k)
i
)
= c
}
, for c = 1, . . . , C. (69)
Using Theorem 2, it can be verified that this scheme satisfies the decoding and privacy constraints. The sum key
rate and the transmission rate of this scheme are given by C/n.
From Claim 9, it follows that χn(G
c)
n is an achievable sum key rate at block length n. The upper bound on
SumKeyRate∗(G) follows since lim
n→∞
χn(Gc)
n = χf (G
c).
To show the lower bound in Theorem 7, we first consider a specific class of side information structures in the
following claim and then extend it to the general case.
Claim 10. If G is such that for every i ∈ [N ], there exists j ∈ [N ] such that i /∈ Aj , then ~R = (R,Rb : b ∈ B) is
in the rate region R(G) only if SumKeyRate(~R) ≥ R.
Proof: For  > 0, for large enough block length n we know there exists a private index coding scheme such
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that the decoding condition (4) and privacy conditions (5) are satisfied.
nR = H(M)
(a)
= I
(
M ;Xn[N ],KB
)
= I
(
M ;Xn[N ]
)
+ I
(
M ;KB
∣∣∣Xn[N ])
≤ I
(
M ;Xn[N ]
)
+H
(
KB
∣∣∣Xn[N ])
(b)
= I
(
M ;Xn[N ]
)
+H
(
KB
)
≤ I
(
M ;Xn[N ]
)
+ nSumKeyRate(R),
where (a) follows from the transmitted message being a deterministic function of the files and the keys, and (b)
follows from the independence between files and keys. We now show that I
(
M ;Xn[N ]
)
vanishes with  for the
side information structure considered in the claim. This is because if the transmitted message is not independent of
the files, then it reveals some information about the files. By our assumption, every message has to be kept private
from at least one of the users, hence this is not allowed. Formally,
I
(
M ;Xn[N ]
)
=
N∑
i=1
I
(
M ;Xni
∣∣Xn1 , . . . , Xni−1)
≤
N∑
i=1
I
(
M ;Xni
∣∣∣Xn[N ]\{i}) , (70)
where the last inequality follows from the independence between files. Next we show that all N terms in the
summation of (70) vanish as n→∞. To prove this, we use our assumption that for each i ∈ [N ], there exists j
such that i /∈ Aj . Consider the ith term in the summation of (70). By the privacy and decodability conditions at j,
I
(
M ;Xni
∣∣∣Xn[N ]\{i}) ≤ I (M ;Xni , Xn[N ]\Aj∪{i}
∣∣∣∣XnAj
)
= I
(
M ;Xn
[N ]\Aj
∣∣∣∣XnAj
)
(a)
≤ I
(
M ;Xn
[N ]\Aj
∣∣∣∣XnAj ,KBj
)
≤ I
(
M,Xnj ;X
n
[N ]\Aj
∣∣∣∣XnAj ,KBj
)
= I
(
M ;Xn
[N ]\Aj
∣∣∣∣XnAj ,KBj
)
+ I
(
Xnj ;X
n
[N ]\Aj
∣∣∣∣M,XnAj ,KBj
)
(b)
≤ n+ I
(
Xnj ;X
n
[N ]\Aj
∣∣∣∣M,XnAj ,KBj
)
≤ n+H
(
Xnj
∣∣∣M,XnAj ,KBj)
(c)
≤ n+ 1 + n,
where (a) follows from Lemma 1, (b) follows from the privacy condition (5) at user j and (c) is obtained from the
decoding condition (4) by applying Fano’s inequality.
Consider the private index coding problem with general side information structure G. Let S be the subset of
vertices of G such that for all i ∈ S and j 6= i, i ∈ Aj , i.e., if i ∈ S, then Xi is available as side information to all
users except user i. Let G′ be the induced subgraph on the vertices [N ] \ S. The rate region for G is contained in
that of G′. This can be argued as follows. Any private index code for G of block length n can be modified into
a private index code for G′ by setting Xni = ~0 for all i ∈ S and Knb = ~0 for all b such that bi = 1 if and only
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if i ∈ S (i.e., keys available exclusively to users in S). This implies that SumKeyRate∗(G′), is upper bounded by
SumKeyRate∗(G).
Consider any private index coding scheme for G′ of block length n. It can be easily verified that appending∑
i∈S X
n
i to the transmitted message creates a private index code for G. Hence, if R
∗(G′) is the optimal transmission
rate for G′, then the optimal transmission rate for G, say R∗(G) is upper bounded by R∗(G′) + 1. Hence,
R∗(G)− 1 ≤ R∗(G′). (71)
Since R∗(G′) ≤ SumKeyRate∗(G′) by Claim 10, and since SumKeyRate∗(G′) ≤ SumKeyRate∗(G), the lower
bound on SumKeyRate∗(G) follows from (71). This proves Theorem 7.
A. Details of Example 1
The linear code in Example 1 can also be given as follows:
1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 00 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1


X1
X2
X3
X4
X5
K10010
K11001
K01110
K00101

=
m1m2
m3

Here users 1, 2 and 3 decode the required data from, M1,M2 and M3, respectively. The decodability Users 4 and 5
obtain their data since X4 = M1 +M2 −X1 and X5 = M2 +M3 −X2. It can be easily verified that this scheme
is a perfect private linear index code as it satisfies the conditions described in Theorem 2.
This scheme also shows that the optimal transmission rate for G is at most 3. Next, we show that the sum key
rate is strictly larger than 3 (at least 3.33), thereby establishing that both the bounds on sum key rate could be
simultaneously loose.
Consider the bound on key rates in Claim 3 used in the proof of Theorem 4. Since 4 /∈ A1, we get the following
inequality
H(KB4\B1) ≥ H(X4)
which implies that ∑
b∈B4\B1
Rb ≥ 1.
Consider all the inequalities that can be obtained in this manner and minimize the sum key rate under these
constraints, i.e., we solve the following LP.
minimize
25−2∑
b=1
Rb
subject to
∑
b∈Bi\Bj
Rb ≥ 1, (i, j) ∈ {(4, 1), (5, 1), (5, 2), (1, 2), (1, 3), (2, 3), (2, 4), (3, 4), (3, 5), (4, 5)}
Rb ≥ 0, b ∈ B.
The solution of this LP, as computed by a program, comes to 3.33. This is strictly greater than the the minimum
transmission rate for the private index code (which is at most 3).
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Class 1 {{i}, {i+ 1, i+ 2}, {i− 1, i− 2}} : i ∈ [5],
{{i, i− 1}, {i, i+ 1}, {i+ 2, i+ 3}} : i ∈ [5],
{{i− 1, i, i+ 1}, {i+ 1, i+ 2}, {i− 1, i− 2}} : i ∈ [5],
Class 2 {{i, i+ 1}, {i+ 1, i+ 2, i+ 3}, {i, i− 1, i− 2}} : i ∈ [5],
Class 3 {{i− 1, i, i+ 1}, {i+ 1, i+ 2, i+ 3}, {i− 1, i− 2, i− 3}} : i ∈ [5],
Class 4 {{i, i+ 1, i+ 2}, {i, i− 1, i− 2}, {i− 1, i− 2, i+ 1, i+ 2}} : i ∈ [5],
TABLE V
FEASIBLE KEY ACCESS STRUCTURES FOR THE PRIVATE INDEX CODING PROBLEM G IN FIGURE 3 ARE CLASSIFIED INTO 4 CLASSES. IN
THE TABLE, ALL ADDITION AND SUBTRACTION ARE MODULO 5.
B. Details of Example 2
Consider the private index coding problem with side information structure G, given in Figure 3. In the sequel,
we will often represent a key access structure as a family of subsets of vertices in G that have access to exclusive
keys. For G, there are 30 feasible key access structures of size 3. These are described in Table V. Note that, in the
table, all the addition and subtraction are modulo 5. One may verify using simple counting arguments that these are
indeed the only feasible key access structures of size 3. These key access structures are divided into 4 classes in the
table. We will show that the transmission rate allowed by the key access structures in each class is lower bound by
at least 3.
a) Class 1: It can be verified that for each key access structure B∗ in class 1, there exists a set S ∈ B∗ and
i, j, k ∈ [5] such that i, j /∈ S, j 6≡ i± 1 mod 5, and B∗k = {S}. For example, consider the key access structure
{{i− 1, i, i+ 1}, {i+ 1, i+ 2}, {i− 1, i− 2}}, for some i ∈ [n]. The key K{i+1,i+2} is not available to users i, i− 2
who are not adjacent to each other (i 6≡ i− 2± 1 mod 5), and it is the only key available at user i+ 2. We will
use this property to show that the transmission rate is at least 3.
Fix i = 5 and consider the specific key access structure B∗ = {{1, 4, 5}, {1, 2}, {3, 4}}. We will show the bound
on transmission rate for B∗. For all the key access structures in this class, the bound can be obtained similarly. For
 > 0, consider a private index code of block length n such that the decoding condition (4) and privacy condition (5)
are satisfied. That is,
P
[
X̂ni = X
n
i ,∀i ∈ [5]
]
≥ 1− , (72)
I
(
M ;Xn
[5]\Ai
∣∣∣∣KB∗i , XnAi
)
≤ n for all i ∈ [5]. (73)
We have,
nR = H(M) ≥ I
(
M ;Xn[5],K11000,K10011,K00110
)
.
Keeping in mind the observation that K11000 is not available at users 3 and 5, we expand the mutual information as
follows.
I
(
M ;Xn[5],K11000,K10011,K00110
)
=I (M ;Xn2 , X
n
3 , X
n
4 ,K00110) + I (M ;X
n
1 , X
n
5 ,K10011|Xn2 , Xn3 , Xn4 ,K00110)
+ I
(
M ;K11000
∣∣∣Xn[5],K00110,K10011) .
This expansion helps us bound the first term using the decoding conditions at user 3 and the second term using that
for user 5. Finally, we will bound the last term using the decoding condition at user 2 who does not possess any
key but K11000. Formally, the first term can be bound as follows.
I (M ;Xn2 , X
n
3 , X
n
4 ,K00110) ≥ I (M ;Xn3 |Xn2 , Xn4 ,K00110)
= H (Xn3 |Xn2 , Xn4 ,K00110)−H (Xn3 |M,Xn2 , Xn4 ,K00110)
= H (Xn3 )−H (Xn3 |M,Xn2 , Xn4 ,K00110)
(a)
≥ n− 1− n = n(1− )− 1,
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where (a) follows from the decoding condition at user 3 by applying Fano’s inequality. Similarly, the second term
may be bounded as follows,
I (M ;Xn1 , X
n
5 ,K10011|Xn2 , Xn3 , Xn4 ,K00110) ≥ I (M ;Xn5 |Xn1 , Xn2 , Xn3 , Xn4 ,K00110,K10011)
= H (Xn5 )−H (Xn5 |M,Xn1 , Xn2 , Xn3 , Xn4 ,K00110,K10011)
a≥ n− 1− n = n(1− )− 1,
where, (a) is obtained directly from the decoding condition at user 5 by applying Fano’s inequality. Note that K11000
is the only key that is available at user 2, i.e., B∗2 = {11000}. Hence the third term may be bounded as follows.
I
(
M ;K11000
∣∣∣Xn[5],K00110,K10011) = I (M ;KB∗2 ∣∣∣Xn[5],KB∗\B∗2)
(a)
≥ I
(
M ;KB∗2
∣∣∣Xn[5])
(b)
≥ n− nO(),
where (a) follows from Lemma 1 and (b) follows from Lemma 9. Taking  to zero, we get the desired lower bound
of 3 on the transmission rate. Note that this bound can be proved in an identical way for all instances in Class 1.
b) Class 2: Since all the key access structures in this class are isomorphic, we will show the bound for the
specific key access structure B∗ = {{1, 2, 5}, {4, 5}, {2, 3, 4}} = {11001, 00011, 01110}. For  > 0, consider a
private index code of block length n such that conditions (72) and (73) are met. The transmission rate can be
bounded as follows.
nR ≥ H(M)
= I
(
M ;Xn[5],K11001,K00011,K01110
)
≥ I (M ;Xn1 |Xn2 , Xn5 ,K11001) + I (M ;Xn3 |Xn1 , Xn4 , Xn2 , Xn5 ,K11001,K01110)
+ I(M ;K00011|Xn[5],K11001,K01110). (74)
Similar to the proof for Class 1, the first and second term in the RHS of (74) may be lower bounded by n(1− )− 1
using the decoding conditions at users 1 and 3, respectively. Since 5 /∈ A2 and B∗5\B∗2 = {00011},B∗5∩B∗2 = {11001},
the third term may be bounded as
I
(
M ;K00011
∣∣∣Xn[5],K11001,K01110) = I (M ;KB∗5\B∗2 ∣∣∣Xn[5],KB∗5∩B∗2 ,K01110)
(a)
≥ I
(
M ;KB∗5\B∗2
∣∣∣Xn[5],KB∗5∩B∗2)
(b)
≥ n− nO(),
where (a) follows from Lemma 1 and (b) follows from Lemma 9. Then taking  to zero, we get the desired lower
bound of 3 on the transmission rate.
c) Class 3: We will prove the bound for the key access structure B∗ = {11001, 01110, 00111} since all the
key access structures in this class are isomorphic to it. For  > 0, we consider a private index code of block length
n such that conditions (72) and (73) are met. The transmission rate is bounded as follows,
nRM ≥ H(M)
≥ I
(
M ;Xn[5],K11001,K01110,K00111
)
≥ I (M ;Xn1 |Xn2 , Xn5 ,K11001) + I
(
M ;K00111
∣∣∣Xn[5],K11001)+ I (M ;K01110∣∣∣Xn[5],K11001,K00111) .
The first term may be lower bounded by n(1− )− 1 using the decoding condition at user 1. Since 5 /∈ A2 and
B∗5 \ B∗2 = {00111} and B∗5 ∩ B∗2 = {11001}, the second term may be bounded as
I
(
M ;K00111
∣∣∣Xn[5],K11001) = I (M ;KB∗5\B∗2 ∣∣∣Xn[5],KB∗5\B∗2)
(a)
≥ n− nO(),
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where (a) follows from Lemma 9. Since 3 /∈ A5 and B∗3 \ B∗5 = {01110} and B∗3 ∩ B∗5 = {00111}, the third term
may be bounded as
I
(
M ;K01110
∣∣∣Xn[5],K11001,K00111) = I (M ;KB∗3\B∗5 ∣∣∣Xn[5],KB∗3∩B∗5 ,K11001)
(a)
≥ I
(
M ;KB∗3\B∗5
∣∣∣Xn[5],KB∗3∩B∗5)
(b)
≥ n− nO(),
where (a) follows from Lemma 1 and (b) follows from Lemma 9. Now, taking  to zero, we get the desired lower
bound of 3 on the transmission rate.
d) Class 4: We prove the bound for the key access structure B∗ = {10011, 11100, 01111} since all the key
access structures in this class are isomorphic to it. For  > 0, consider a private index code of block length n such
that conditions (72) and (73) are met. We can bound the transmission rate as follows,
nR ≥ H(M) ≥ I
(
M ;Xn[5],K10011,K11100,K01111
)
≥ I (M ;Xn5 |Xn1 , Xn4 ,K10011,K01111) + I (M ;K11100|Xn1 , Xn2 , Xn4 , Xn5 ,K10011,K01111)
+ I
(
M ;Xn3
∣∣Xn1 , Xn2 , Xn4 , Xn5 ,KB∗) .
The first and third terms may be lower bounded by n(1− )− 1 using the decoding conditions at receivers 5 and 3,
respectively. The second term cannot be directly bounded using Lemma 9 like we bounded the third term in the
previous cases. But, using Lemma 1, we lower bound this term by
I (M ;K11100|Xn1 , Xn2 , Xn4 , Xn5 ,K10011,K01111) ≥ I (M ;K11100|Xn1 , Xn2 , Xn5 ,K10011) .
Consider the following mutual information.
I (M ;Xn1 ,K11100|Xn2 , Xn5 ,K10011) = I (M ;Xn1 |Xn2 , Xn5 ,K10011) + I (M ;K11100|Xn1 , Xn2 , Xn5 ,K10011)
(a)
≤ I (M ;K11100|Xn1 , Xn2 , Xn5 ,K10011) + I
(
M ;Xn1
∣∣∣Xn[5]\{1},K10011,K01111)
= I (M ;K11100|Xn1 , Xn2 , Xn5 ,K10011) + I
(
M ;Xn1
∣∣∣Xn[5]\{1},KB∗4)
(b)
≤ I (M ;K11100|Xn1 , Xn2 , Xn5 ,K10011) + n,
where (a) follows from Lemma 1 and (b) follows from privacy condition at receiver 4 since 1 /∈ A4. The same
mutual information term can also be expanded as
I (M ;Xn1 ,K11100|Xn2 , Xn5 ,K10011) ≥ I (M ;Xn1 |Xn2 , Xn5 ,K10011,K11100)
(a)
= H (Xn1 )−H (Xn1 |M,Xn2 , Xn5 ,K10011,K11100)
(b)
≥ n− (n+ 1)
where, (a) follows from the independence of files and keys and (b) is obtained from decoding condition at user 1
and Fano’s inequality. From the above two observations, we have,
I (M ;K11100|Xn1 , Xn2 , Xn4 , Xn5 ,K10011,K01111) ≥ I (M ;K11100|Xn1 , Xn2 , Xn5 ,K10011)
≥ n− (2n+ 1).
Taking  to zero, we get the desired lower bound of 3 on the transmission rate.
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APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 8
A. Proof of Lemma 4
Consider a (n, , δ)-CREPIC scheme with encoder φ and decoder ψi at user i : i ∈ [N ]. We show the existence
of w∗ ∈ W such that conditioned W = w∗, the decoding error is at most 2 and privacy leakage is at most 2Nδ.
Define the events Baddec and Badprivi : i ∈ [N ] as follows.
Baddec :=
{
w ∈ W : ∃i ∈ [N ] such that P
[
X̂ni 6= Xni |W = w
]
> 2
}
,
Badprivi :=
{
w ∈ W : I
(
M ;Xn
[N ]\Ai
∣∣∣∣KBi , XnAi ,W = w
)
> 2nNδ
}
.
Since the given scheme is (n, , δ)-CREPIC, applying Markov’s inequality to conditions (36) and (37), respectively,
we get,
P
[
Baddec
]
< 1/2 and P
[
Badprivi
]
< 1/2N for all i ∈ [N ].
Taking a union bound of these events, it is seen that there exists w∗ ∈ W such that w∗ /∈ ∪i∈[N ]Badprivi ∪ Baddec.
Define encoder φ′ and decoders {ψ′i}i∈[N ] as follows
φ′
(
Xn[N ],KB
)
= φ
(
Xn[N ],KB,W = w
)
,
ψ′i
(
M,XnAi ,KBi
)
= ψi
(
M,XnAi ,KBi ,W = w
)
.
Clearly, the above scheme is (n, 2, 2Nδ)-REPIC. This proves the lemma.
B. Proof of Lemma 5
By Corollary 1, it is sufficient to show that if the rate (R,Rb : b ∈ B) is achievable using REPIC schemes then
for all δ > 0, rate (R + δ,Rb : b ∈ B) can be achieved using zero-error REPIC schemes. Fix δ > 0,  > 0. For
an appropriately chosen block-length n, using an (n, , )-REPIC scheme of rate (R,Rb : b ∈ B), we construct a
(n, ′)-zero-error REPIC scheme of rate (R + δ,Rb : b ∈ B), where ′ = (3 + N). Clearly, such a construction
proves the lemma. A formal description such a construction and its analysis follows.
For  > 0, choose n large enough such that the following properties are satisfied.
1) There exits a (n, , )-REPIC scheme with encoder φ and decoders {ψi}i∈[N ].
2) Since transmission rate (R,Rb : b ∈ B) is achievable using REPIC schemes, by Theorem 3, there exists a
zero-error index code of rate R for large enough block-length k.
3) n ≥ max (3δkR, 3δ , 1 ).
Recall that when xn ∈ X n, the co-ordinate i of xn is denoted by x(i). For xn ∈ X n and 1 ≤ j ≤ dnk e, define
blockj(x
n) :=
{
(x(k(j−1)+1), . . . , x(kj)) for 1 ≤ j < dnk e,
(x(k(j−1)+1), . . . , x(n), 0, . . . , 0) if j = dnk e.
Consider a non-private zero-error index coding scheme of block-length k and rate R with encoder α and decoders
βi for user i ∈ [N ]. From this scheme, we construct a zero-error index coding scheme of block-length n with
encoder α′ and decoders β′i for user i ∈ [N ] as follows. For xni ∈ X n : i ∈ [N ],
α′
(
xn[N ]
)
= (m1,m2, . . . ,mdn
k
e) where mj = α
(
(blockj(x
n
` ))`∈[N ]
)
for 1 ≤ j ≤ dn
k
e,
β′i
(
m1, . . . ,mdn
k
e, xnAi
)
= ( ̂block1(xni ), . . . , ̂blockdnk e(x
n
i )) where ̂blockj(xni ) = βi
(
mj , (blockj(x
n
` ))`∈Ai
)
.
The index code for block-length n is the concatenation of dnk e copies of zero-error index code for block-length k,
hence it is also a zero-error index code. The rate of this scheme is k·d
n
k
e·R
n ≤ Rn · (n+ k) ≤ R+ δ/3.
The (n, ′) zero-error REPIC with encoder φ′ and decoders ψ′i for user i ∈ [N ], is a hybrid of the above mentioned
(n, , )-REPIC scheme and the n block-length index coding scheme. Intuitively, the new scheme falls back to
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the zero-error index coding whenever the REPIC scheme is found to make an error at any of the decoders. A
formal description follows. For files xnj ∈ X n for j ∈ [N ] and keys kb ∈ FnRb for b ∈ B and private randomness
wφ ∈ Wφ of encoder φ′ (which is identical to the private randomness of encoder φ), when m = φ(xn[N ], kB, wφ)
φ′
(
xn[N ], kB, wφ
)
= (θ, mˆ, zerosθ) where
{
θ = 0 and mˆ := m if ψi(m,xnAi , kBi) = x
n
i ,∀i ∈ [N ],
θ = 1 and mˆ := α′(xn[N ]) otherwise.
(75)
zerosθ is the appropriate length of zero padding needed to keep the transmission at R + δ. The encoder uses
the (n, )-REPIC scheme whenever it can be correctly decoded at all users, if not, it uses the zero-error index
coding scheme whenever the REPIC scheme commits an error. The value of θ records the used scheme. That the
transmission can be made R+ δ (by zero padding) follows from the fact that (θ, mˆ) is at most 1 + n(R+ δ3) long
since rate of the index code being being at most R+ δ/3; recollect that 1n ≤ δ3 . For i ∈ [N ],
ψ′i :
(
θ, mˆ, zerosθ, xnAi , kBi
)
=
{
ψi(mˆ, x
nAi , kBi) if θ = 0,
β′i(mˆ, x
nAi) otherwise.
(76)
We will establish that this is a (n, ′)-zero-error REPIC scheme of rate (R+ δ,Rb : b ∈ B). By construction, it has
block-length n and rate (R+ δ,Rb : b ∈ B). It is easy to observe that it also guarantees zero-error decoding at all
receivers. Next we show that its privacy parameter is ′, completing the proof of the lemma.
For files Xn[N ] and keys KB , let Θ and Mˆ , respectively, represent the random variables corresponding to values
of θ and mˆ at the output of the encoder φ′ (See (75)). The privacy condition at user i is,
I
(
Mˆ,Θ;Xn
[N ]\Ai
∣∣∣∣KBi , XnAi
)
= I
(
Θ;Xn
[N ]\Ai
∣∣∣∣KBi , XnAi
)
+ I
(
Mˆ ;Xn
[N ]\Ai
∣∣∣∣KBi , XnAi ,Θ
)
≤ H(Θ) + I
(
Mˆ ;Xn
[N ]\Ai
∣∣∣∣KBi , XnAi ,Θ
)
. (77)
Second term in the RHS can be bounded as follows.
I
(
Mˆ ;Xn
[N ]\Ai
∣∣∣∣KBi , XnAi ,Θ
)
= P [Θ = 0] I
(
Mˆ ;Xn
[N ]\Ai
∣∣∣∣KBi , XnAi ,Θ = 0
)
+ P [Θ = 1] I
(
Mˆ ;Xn
[N ]\Ai
∣∣∣∣KBi , XnAi ,Θ = 1
)
≤ P [Θ = 0] I
(
Mˆ ;Xn
[N ]\Ai
∣∣∣∣KBi , XnAi ,Θ = 0
)
+ H
(
Xn[N ]
)
. (78)
By the definition of Θ in (75), P [Θ = 1] ≤  since the decoding error of (n, )-REPIC scheme is at most . Hence, the
inequality (78) follows from I
(
Mˆ ;Xn
[N ]\Ai
∣∣∣∣KBi , XnAi ,Θ = 1
)
≤ H
(
Xn[N ]
)
. When Θ = 0, Mˆ = φ
(
Xn[N ],KB
)
.
Then,
P [Θ = 0] · I
(
Mˆ ;Xn
[N ]\Ai
∣∣∣∣KBi , XnAi ,Θ = 0
)
= P [Θ = 0] · I
(
φ
(
Xn[N ],KB
)
;Xn
[N ]\Ai
∣∣∣∣KBi , XnAi ,Θ = 0
)
≤ I
(
φ
(
Xn[N ],KB
)
;Xn
[N ]\Ai
∣∣∣∣KBi , XnAi ,Θ
)
≤ I
(
φ
(
Xn[N ],KB
)
,Θ;Xn
[N ]\Ai
∣∣∣∣KBi , XnAi
)
≤ I
(
φ
(
Xn[N ],KB
)
;Xn
[N ]\Ai
∣∣∣∣KBi , XnAi
)
+H(Θ)
≤ n+H(Θ). (79)
The last inequality follows from the scheme with encoder φ and decoders {ψi}i∈[N ] being a (n, )-REPIC scheme.
Since H
(
Xn[N ]
)
= nN in (78) and H(Θ) ≤ 1 in (77) and (79), by substituting (79) in (78), and (78) in (77), and
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using n > 1 , we get
I
(
Mˆ,Θ;Xn
[N ]\Ai
∣∣∣∣KBi , XnAi
)
≤ n(1 +N)+ 2 ≤ n′. (80)
C. Proof of Claim 1
The encoder φ can be thought of as a channel from
(
Xn[N ],KB
)
to M := φ
(
Xn[N ],KB,Wφ
)
, with the private
randomness of the encoder Wφ being the randomness of the channel. Between a sender and receiver, this channel
can be simulated (asymptotically) using a channel simulation scheme that uses only common randomness between
the sender and the users (and no private randomness at the sender). Below we state a result from channel simulation,
modified for our purposes.
Theorem 13. [29, Theorem 10] Consider random variables (U, V ) jointly distributed over U ×V . For any , δ > 0,
there is a large enough m, β ≤ I(U ;V ) + δ, common randomness W distributed uniformly over a finite set W ,
and deterministic maps Enc and Dec such that, when the operator ‖.‖ denotes total variation distance,
Enc : Um ×W → 2mβ, Dec : 2mβ ×W → Vm, and ‖(Um, V m)− (Um,Dec (Enc(Um,W ) ,W )‖ ≤ .
In the sequel, to avoid confusion, for each b ∈ B, the random variable for the keys (of rate nRb) used in the
(n, )-zero-error-REPIC scheme is denoted by Knb and the transmitted message is denoted by M
n. Furthermore,
m i.i.d. copies of Xni : i ∈ [N ] is denoted by Xn,m, and m i.i.d. copies of Knb : b ∈ B and Mn are denoted by
Kn,m and Mn,m, respectively. For 1 ≤ j ≤ m, the jth, n-sized block in Xn,mi ,Kn,mb and Mn,m are denoted by
X
n,(j)
i ,K
n,(j)
b and M
n,(j), respectively.
Substituting
(
Xn[N ],K
nB
)
and Mn for U and V , respectively, in above theorem we can conclude that there exists
a large enough m, common randomness W , and functions Enc and Dec such that the image of Enc is Fmβ , where
mβ ≤ m
(
I
(
Xn[N ],K
nB;Mn
)
+ n ·min(, δ)
)
≤ mn(R+ min(, δ)), and (81)∥∥∥∥(Xn,m[N ] ,Kn,mB ,Mn,m)− (Xn,m[N ] ,Kn,mB ,Dec (J,W ))
∥∥∥∥ ≤ , where J := Enc((Xn,m[N ] ,Kn,mB ) ,W) . (82)
Since Dec (J,W ) is statistically close to Mn,m, we will denote it by M̂n,m.
Below, we define a mn block-length scheme with encoder φ′ and decoders {ψi}i∈[N ] that use common randomness
W and no private randomness at encoder or decoders.
φ′
(
Xn,m[N ] ,K
n,m
B ,W
)
= Enc
(
Xn,m[N ] ,K
n,m
B ,W
)
= J,
ψ′i
(
J,Xn,mAi ,K
n,m
Bi ,W
)
=
(
X̂
n,(1)
i , . . . , X̂
n,(m)
i
)
,where X̂n,(j)i := ψi
(
M̂n,(j), X
n,(j)
Ai ,K
n,(j)
Bi
)
.
This is a mn block-length scheme and form (81) it follows that its rate is (R + δ,Rb : b ∈ B). If  < δ, the
transmission rate can be made R+ δ by zero-padding. Next, we establish that the decoding error of this scheme is
at most . The decoding error of is given by the expression,
1− P
[
X̂
n,(j)
i = X
n,(j)
i ,∀i ∈ [N ], j ∈ [m]
]
.
Inequality (82) implies that∥∥∥∥(Mn,(j), Xn,(j)Ai ,Kn,(j)Bi )j∈[m],i∈[N ] − (M̂n,(j), Xn,(j)Ai ,Kn,(j)Bi )i∈[m],j∈[N ]
∥∥∥∥ ≤ .
Hence, by the definition of statistical distance,
P
[
ψ′i
(
M̂n,(j), X
n,(j)
Ai ,K
n,(j)
Bi
)
= X
n,(j)
i , i ∈ [N ], j ∈ [m]
]
≥ P
[
ψi
(
Mn,(j), X
n,(j)
Ai ,K
n,(j)
Bi
)
= X
n,(j)
i , i ∈ [N ], j ∈ [m]
]
− .
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Since the scheme with encoder φ and decoders ψi for user i ∈ [N ] is a zero-error REPIC scheme,
P
[
ψi
(
Mn,(j), X
n,(j)
Ai ,K
n,(j)
Bi
)
= X
n,(j)
i , i ∈ [N ], j ∈ [m]
]
= 1.
Hence the decoding error the new scheme with encoder φ′ and decoders ψ′i for user i ∈ [N ] is at most .
To analyze the privacy parameter, we use the following lemma that claims that two distributions that are statistically
close are also close in their entropies.
Lemma 10. [30, Lemma 2.7] If P,Q are two distributions on a finite set X such that ‖P −Q‖ ≤ , then
|H (P )−H (Q)| ≤ (log |X | − log ).
The privacy condition at user i ∈ [N ] is given by the mutual information,
I
(
J ;Xn,m
[N ]\Ai
∣∣∣∣Kn,mBi , Xn,mAi ,W
)
≤ I
(
J,W ;Xn,m
[N ]\Ai
∣∣∣∣Kn,mBi , Xn,mAi
)
. (83)
Since M̂n,m is a function of (J,W ), the above inequality implies that,
I
(
J ;Xn,m
[N ]\Ai
∣∣∣∣Kn,mBi , Xn,mAi ,W
)
≤ I
(
J,W, M̂n,m;Xn,m
[N ]\Ai
∣∣∣∣Kn,mBi , Xn,mAi
)
= I
(
M̂n,m;Xn,m
[N ]\Ai
∣∣∣∣Kn,mBi , Xn,mAi
)
+ I
(
J,W ;Xn,m
[N ]\Ai
∣∣∣∣Kn,mBi , Xn,mAi , M̂n,m
)
. (84)
The first term in the RHS of (84) is upper bounded using the following observation. Using Lemma 10,
I
(
M̂n,m;Xn,m
[N ]\Ai
∣∣∣∣Kn,mBi , Xn,mAi
)
− I
(
Mn,m;Xn,m
[N ]\Ai
∣∣∣∣Kn,mBi , Xn,mAi
)
= I
(
M̂n,m,Kn,mBi , X
n,m
Ai ;X
n,m
[N ]\Ai
)
− I
(
Mn,m,Kn,mBi , X
n,m
Ai ;X
n,m
[N ]\Ai
)
. (85)
This follows from I
(
Kn,mBi , X
n,m
Ai ;X
n,m
[N ]\Ai
)
= 0 as the files and keys are independently distributed. The RHS can
be expanded as,
H
(
M̂n,m,Kn,mBi , X
n,m
Ai
)
−
(
H
(
M̂n,m,Kn,mBi , X
n,m
Ai , X
n,m
[N ]\Ai
)
−H
(
Xn,m
[N ]\Ai
))
−H
(
Mn,m,Kn,mBi , X
n,m
Ai
)
+
(
H
(
Mn,m,Kn,mBi , X
n,m
Ai , X
n,m
[N ]\Ai
)
−H
(
Xn,m
[N ]\Ai
))
.
Since, ∥∥∥∥(Mn,m, Xn,m[N ] ,Kn,mB )− (M̂n,m, Xn,m[N ] ,Kn,mB )
∥∥∥∥ ≤ ,
by Lemma 10, the above expression can be bounded as,
H
(
M̂n,m,Kn,mBi , X
n,m
Ai
)
−H
(
M̂n,m,Kn,mBi , X
n,m
Ai , X
n,m
[N ]\Ai
)
−H
(
Mn,m,Kn,mBi , X
n,m
Ai
)
+H
(
Mn,m,Kn,mBi , X
n,m
Ai , X
n,m
[N ]\Ai
)
≤ 2
(
log support
(
Mn,m, Xn,m[N ] ,K
n,m
B
)
− log 
)
≤ 2
mn
R+N + ∑
b∈B
Rb
+ log 1

 . (86)
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From (85) and (85), we can conclude that,
I
(
M̂n,m;Xn,m
[N ]\Ai
∣∣∣∣Kn,mBi , Xn,mAi
)
≤ I
(
Mn,m;Xn,m
[N ]\Ai
∣∣∣∣Kn,mBi , Xn,mAi
)
+ 2
mn
R+N + ∑
b∈B
Rb
+ log 1


= m · I
(
Mn;Xn
[N ]\Ai
∣∣∣∣KnBi , XnAi
)
+ 2
mn
R+N + ∑
b∈B
Rb
+ log 1


≤ mn+ 2
mn
R+N + ∑
b∈B
Rb
+ log 1

 . (87)
Here, the last inequality follows from the privacy condition at user i for the given block-length n scheme. The
second term in the RHS of (84) can be bounded as
I
(
J,W ;Xn,m
[N ]\Ai
∣∣∣∣Kn,mBi , Xn,mAi , M̂n,m
)
≤ I
(
J,W ;Xn,m[N ] ,K
n,m
B
∣∣∣M̂n,m) = I (J,W, M̂n,m;Xn,m[N ] ,Kn,mB )− I (M̂n,m;Xn,m[N ] ,Kn,mB ) . (88)
We upper bound the RHS of (88) by upper bounding the first term and lower bounding the second term. The first
term can be upper bounded as follows.
I
(
J,W, M̂n,m;Xn,m[N ] ,K
n,m
B
)
(a)
= I
(
J,W ;Xn,m[N ] ,K
n,m
B
)
(b)
= I
(
J ;Xn,m[N ] ,K
n,m
B
∣∣∣W)
≤ H(J)
(c)
≤ mβ
(d)
≤ m
(
I
(
Mn;Xn[N ],K
nB
)
+ n
)
= I
(
Mn,m;Xn,m[N ] ,K
n,m
B
)
+mn. (89)
Here, (a) follows from M̂n,m being a deterministic function of J,W , (b) follows from the independence between
W and Xn,m,Kn,mB , (c) follows from the range of Enc being Fmβ , and finally, (d) follows from (81). Similar to
the bound (87) obtained on the first term in the RHS of (84), using Lemma 10, we bound the second term in the
RHS of (88) as
I
(
M̂n,m;Xn,m[N ] ,K
n,m
B
)
≥ I
(
Mn,m;Xn,m[N ] ,K
n,m
B
)
− 2
mn
R+N + ∑
b∈B
Rb
+ log 1

 . (90)
By substituting (90) and (89) in (88), we get
I
(
J,W ;Xn,m
[N ]\Ai
∣∣∣∣Kn,mBi , Xn,mAi , M̂n,m
)
≤ mn+ 2
mn
R+N + ∑
b∈B
Rb
+ log 1

 . (91)
Using the bounds (91) and (87) in (84), for all i ∈ [N ],
I
(
J ;Xn,m
[N ]\Ai
∣∣∣∣Kn,mBi , Xn,mAi ,W
)
≤ 2mn+ 4
mn
R+N + ∑
b∈B
Rb
+ log 1

 ≤ mn′,
where ′ = 4
1
2
+R+N +
∑
b∈B
Rb +
1
mn
· log 1

 . (92)
Hence, the new scheme has privacy error ′. The common randomness W used in the scheme can be fixed to an
appropriate value (see Lemma 4) to obtain a (mn, 2, 2N′)-PIC scheme. This proves the claim as ′ → 0 as → 0.
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D. Proof of Lemma 7
Consider perfect private linear index coding scheme for N users of block-length n and rate R, that uses private
randomness at the encoder. Let Xi denote the row-vector corresponding to Xn, Kb : b ∈ B, denote the key
uniformly distributed in FnRb and let P denote the private randomness uniformly distributed in Fp for some number
p. Since B is the same as {1, . . . , 2N − 2}, in the sequel, we will often represent b as a number between 1 and
2N − 2. A linear encoder of the scheme may be described as follows.
M =
∑
i∈[N ]
GiX
T
i +
∑
1≤b≤2N−2
HbK
T
b +H
′P
=
[
G1 . . . GN H1 . . . H2N−2 H ′
] [
X1 . . . XN K1 . . . K2N−2 P
]T
:= Ψ
[
X1 . . . XN K1 . . . K2N−2 P
]T
where Gi ∈ FnR×n, Hb ∈ FnR×nRb and H ′ ∈ FnR×np and Φ is the generator matrix of the encoder. For i ∈ [N ],
by the zero-error decoding condition, there exists Li ∈ Fn×nR, Sij ∈ Fn×n where j ∈ Ai and T ib ∈ Fn×nRb where
b ∈ Bi such that
Xi = L
iM+
∑
j∈Ai
SijX
T
i +
∑
b∈Bi
T ibK
T
b . (93)
Hence, LiM is determined by Xi, i ∈ Ai and Kb,b ∈ Bi and it is independent of P. Consider the encoding scheme[
M1 . . . MN
]T
=
[
(L1)T . . . (LN )T
]T
Φ.
[
X1 . . . XN K1 . . . K2N−2 P
]T
.
It follows from the above observation that this encoder does not use private randomness. The actual encoding will
use a row-reduced form of the matrix
[
(L1)T . . . (LN )T
]T
Φ; i.e., after removing the independent rows. Clearly,
this encoding scheme is private since Ψ is private. It follows from (93) that
Xi = M
i +
∑
j∈Ai
SijX
T
i +
∑
b∈Bi
T ibK
T
b .
Hence, we have obtained a linear private index coding scheme that does not use private randomness. Since the rank
of [(L1)T . . . (LN )T ]TΦ is at most the rank of Φ, the rate of this scheme is at most the rate of the given scheme.
This proves the lemma.
APPENDIX F
DETAILS OMITTED IN SECTION VIII
A. Proof of Lemma 8
Let i, j ∈ [N ], i 6= j be such that i /∈ Aj and Ai ⊆ Aj . By Fano’s inequality, the decodability criterion for user i
implies that for each  > 0, there exists a large enough block length n such that
H
(
Xni |M,XnAi
)
≤ n.
Since Ai ⊆ (j ∪ Aj), it follows that H
(
Xni |M,Xnj , XnAj
)
≤ n. Since i /∈ Aj , consider the weak privacy
condition for message Xi at user j
I
(
M,Xnj , X
nAj ;X
n
i
)
= H (Xni )−H
(
Xni |M,Xnj , XnAj
)
≥ n− n,
where the last inequality follows since H
(
Xni |M,Xnj , XnAj
)
≤ n, and H (Xni ) = n. Thus, in this case weak
privacy cannot be achieved. This proves Lemma 8.
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B. Proof of Claim 2
From the decodability condition of user 1, for each  > 0 and large enough block length n, we have
H (Xn1 |M,Xn3 , Xn4 ) ≤ n
which implies that I (M,Xn3 , X
n
4 ;X
n
1 ) ≥ n(1− ). Using the chain rule of mutual information, we obtain
I (M,Xn3 , X
n
4 ;X
n
1 ) = I (M,X
n
3 ;X
n
1 ) + I (X
n
4 ;X
n
1 |M,Xn3 ) (94)
≥ n(1− ).
First, let us assume that I (M,Xn3 ;X
n
1 ) ≥ n(1− ′) for some 0 < ′ < . Then, it clearly violates the privacy of
Xn1 at user 6 since user 6 has both M and X
n
3 . This implies that I (M,X
n
3 ;X
n
1 ) cannot be greater than n
′. By
assuming I (M,Xn3 ;X
n
1 ) ≤ n′, it follows from (94) that I (Xn4 ;Xn1 |M,Xn3 ) ≥ n(1− ′′), where ′′ = − ′. Thus,
we have
I (Xn4 ;X
n
1 ,M,X
n
3 ) ≥ n(1− ′′). (95)
This implies that user 3 will learn about Xn4 since it has (X
n
1 ,M,X
n
3 ) which violates the privacy of X4 at user 3.
This shows that if the decodability conditions are satisfied at all users, we cannot achieve weak privacy for this
example.
C. Proof of Theorem 9
To prove the theorem, we assume that there exists a user i ∈ [N ] for which the condition is satisfied, and we
show that weak privacy is not feasible. The decodability condition for user i gives that for each  > 0 and large
enough block length n, we have
I
(
XnAi ,M ;X
n
i
)
≥ n(1− ). (96)
First, let us assume that S = Ai. Then there exists a user j ∈ [N ] and a k ∈ [N ] such that Ai \ {k} ⊆ Aj and
k /∈ Aj . If k = i, then it violates the subset condition given in Lemma 8, so weak privacy is not feasible. Hence,
let us assume that k 6= i. Then for S = S′ ∪ {k}
I (M,XnS′ , X
n
k ;X
n
i ) = I (M,X
n
S′ ;X
n
i ) + I (X
n
k ;X
n
i |M,XnS′) (97)
≥ n(1− ).
If I (Xnk ;X
n
i |M,XnS′) ≥ n(1− ′) for some 0 < ′ < , then
I (M,XnS′ , X
n
i ;X
n
k ) ≥ n(1− ′)
since I (Xnk ;X
n
i |M,XnS ) ≤ I (M,XnS , Xni ;Xnk ). Since user j has (M,XnS′ , Xni ), it violates the privacy of Xk at
user j. So, let us assume that I (Xnk ;X
n
i |M,XnS ) ≤ n′. Then it follows from (97) that I (M,XnS′ ;Xni ) ≥ n(1− ′′),
where ′′ = − ′. Since the given condition in Theorem 9 satisfies for all subsets of Ai, by following the above
arguments, we can show that for some k ∈ [N ] and S′′ ⊆ Ai such that S′ = S′′ ∪ {k}, we have
I (M,XnS′′ ;X
n
i ) ≥ n(1− ˜) (98)
for some ˜ > 0. If we continue this, we get that for some l ∈ [N ], l 6= i,
I (M,Xnl ;X
n
i ) ≥ n(1− δ) for some δ > 0.
Now let us take S = {l, i}. In this case, if k = i, then it clearly violates the privacy of Xi at the user since the user
has both M and Xnl . So, let k = l. Then,
I (M,Xnl ;X
n
i ) = I (M ;X
n
i ) + I (X
n
l ;X
n
i |M) .
As we already noted that if I (M ;Xni ) is large, then it violates the privacy at some user. This implies that
I (Xnl ;X
n
i |M) ≥ n(1− δ′) for some δ′ > 0. Since I (Xnl ;Xni |M) ≤ I (M,Xni ;Xnl ), it violates the privacy of Xl
at the user who does not have Xl. This shows that we cannot achieve weak privacy in this case. This completes the
proof of the theorem.
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D. Proof of Theorem 10
Let CG denote a secure clique cover for the index coding problem represented by graph G and let C1, C2, . . . , C|CG|
be the cliques in CG. Further, let
Mi =
∑
j∈Ci
Xj , i = 1, . . . , |CG|. (99)
The server transmits message M =
{
M1, . . . ,M|CG|
}
. Let ki denote the index of the clique that i belongs to, i.e.,
i ∈ Cki . Since the cliques are disjoint, this index is unique. User i decodes Xi from Mki since it has Xj , j 6= i for
all j ∈ Cki . Next we prove that this scheme also satisfies the weak privacy. To this end, we show that if j /∈ Ai,
then
I(M ;Xj |XAi) = 0. (100)
We show (100) by using the facts that the cliques are disjoint and if user i does not have Xj as side information,
then it does not have access to at least one more message Xl, l ∈ Ckj . We first define
M˜(kj) = M \ {Mkj}.
Then, we have
I(M ;Xj |XAi) = I
(
M˜(kj);Xj |XAi
)
+ I
(
Mkj ;Xj |XAi , M˜(kj)
)
= I
(
Mkj ;Xj |XAi , M˜(kj)
)
(101)
= I
∑
l∈Ckj
Xl;Xj |XAi , M˜(kj)
 (102)
= I
 ∑
l∈Ckj \Ai
Xl;Xj |XAi , M˜(kj)
 (103)
= I
 ∑
l∈Ckj \Ai
Xl;Xj
 (104)
= 0. (105)
Here, (101) follows since Xj is not part of XAi or M˜(kj), and in (102), we used the definition of Mi given in (99).
Further, (103) follows since any Xl, l ∈ Ckj \ Ai is not part of XAi or M˜(kj) because of the definition of secure
clique cover, and (105) follows since there exists an l 6= j such that l ∈ Ckj \ Ai which implies that
∑
l∈Ckj \Ai Xl
is independent of Xj .
E. Details of Fig. 8
In this subsection, we argue that the example in Fig. 8 does not have a secure clique cover, but it is still feasible
under weak privacy. For the given index coding problem, if i ∈ Aj , then j /∈ Ai. Then, the only clique cover of the
side information graph is of all singleton sets which is not secure. Thus, it has no secure clique cover. We give a
linear encoding matrix M that satisfies the decodability and privacy condition for weak privacy. The matrix M is as
given below
M =

1 1 1 0 0 0 1
0 1 1 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 1 1 0 1
1 0 0 1 0 1 1
1 1 0 1 1 0 0
1 0 1 0 1 1 0
0 1 0 0 1 1 1

44
Let Mi denote the ith column of M , and for a subset S of the columns let 〈MS〉 denote the span of all the
columns in S. The decodability conditions are satisfied for M since M1 /∈ 〈M{4,5,6}〉,M2 /∈ 〈M{1,5,7}〉,M3 /∈
〈M{1,2,6}〉,M4 /∈ 〈M{2,3,5}〉,M5 /∈ 〈M{3,6,7}〉,M6 /∈ 〈M{2,4,7}〉, and M7 /∈ 〈M{1,3,4}〉. The privacy constraints are
satisfied since
M1 ∈ 〈M{5,7}〉 ∩ 〈M{2,6}〉 ∩ 〈M{3,4}〉
M2 ∈ 〈M{1,6}〉 ∩ 〈M{3,5}〉 ∩ 〈M{4,7}〉
M3 ∈ 〈M{2,5}〉 ∩ 〈M{6,7}〉 ∩ 〈M{1,4}〉
M4 ∈ 〈M{5,6}〉 ∩ 〈M{2,7}〉 ∩ 〈M{1,3}〉
M5 ∈ 〈M{4,6}〉 ∩ 〈M{1,7}〉 ∩ 〈M{2,3}〉
M6 ∈ 〈M{4,5}〉 ∩ 〈M{1,2}〉 ∩ 〈M{3,7}〉
M7 ∈ 〈M{1,5}〉 ∩ 〈M{3,6}〉 ∩ 〈M{2,4}〉.
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF THEOREM 12
In Claim 11 below, we argue that without loss of generality, we can restrict ourselves to multicast schemes in
which the following holds for each Sk:
if i, j ∈ Sk, then i ∈ Aj and j ∈ Ai, for all i, j ∈ [N ], i 6= j. (106)
Claim 11. From any multicast scheme MK with K sessions, we can obtain a scheme M′K with K sessions such
that for all S ′k in M′K it holds that if i, j ∈ S ′k, then i ∈ Aj and j ∈ Ai.
Proof: For a given k = 1, . . . ,K, let i ∈ Sk. Then, the perfect privacy criterion for user i implies that
I
(
Mk, X
n
i , X
nAi ;X
n
[N ]\Ai
)
= 0. (107)
Then, we have
I
(
Mk;X
n
[N ]\Ai |X
n
Ai
)
= 0. (108)
For any j ∈ [N ] \ Ai, from (108) we get
I
(
Mk;X
n
j |Xn[N ]\j
)
= 0. (109)
Since Aj ⊆ [N ]\{j} and by using the fact that files are independent, it follows from (109) that I
(
Mk;X
n
j |XnAj
)
= 0.
This implies that user j learns nothing about Xnj from Mk. Thus, Mk is not useful to user j in decoding X
n
j . Then
it follows that if j ∈ Sk, then we can modify Sk to S ′k by excluding {j} in Sk, i.e., S ′k = Sk \ {j}. This proves
the claim.
Next we show that at block length n, the minimum number of multicasts required is the n-fold chromatic number
of Gc.
Claim 12. κn(G) = χn(Gc).
Proof: To prove this claim, we restrict ourselves to the multicast schemes of the form (106). We prove the
claim by showing that at block length n, from any multicast scheme of the form (106) we can obtain an n-fold
coloring, and we can also obtain a multicast scheme from any n-fold coloring.
Recall that an n-fold coloring is an assignment of sets of size n to each vertex such that adjacent vertices get
disjoint sets. For an n-fold coloring, let Ci denote the set of size n assigned to vertex i, i ∈ [N ]. From a multicast
scheme with K sessions, we obtain an n-fold coloring Ci, i ∈ [N ] as follows: Since each multicast session transmits
one symbol from F, to recover Xni at user i, the cardinality of the set {k : i ∈ Sk} should be at least n. We obtain
the set Ci by including the first n indices from the set {k : i ∈ Sk} to Ci. Suppose vertices i and j are adjacent in
Gc. Then, the sets Ci and Cj obtained by this method are disjoint since for any k = 1, . . . ,K, both i and j do not
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belong to Sk. This is because i, j ∈ Sk for some k implies that i and j are not adjacent in Gc due to (106). Thus,
we have an n-fold coloring.
Now we show that we can obtain a multicast scheme with K sessions from an n-fold coloring with K colors.
Let us assume that the K colors of the n-fold coloring are numbered from 1 to K. Without loss of generality, we
assume that the set Ci, i ∈ [N ] is an ordered set. For k ∈ Ci, k = 1, . . . ,K, let Ci(k) denote its position in the set
Ci. By denoting the jth instance of ith message by X(j)i , the message Mk transmitted in the kth multicast session is
given by
Mk =
∑
i:k∈Ci
X
(Ci(k))
i , k = 1, . . . ,K.
If j ∈ Sk, then user j can decode X(Cj(k))j since it has access to all the other random variables
{
X
(Ci(k))
i , i 6= j
}
in Mk. It is easy to observe that this scheme achieves perfect privacy. This shows that κn(G) is given by the n-fold
chromatic number χn(Gc).
From Claim 12, it follows that
κ(G) = inf
n
κn(G)
n
= inf
n
χn(G
c)
n
= χf (G
c).
This proves Theorem 12.
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